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PHYSICIANS WHO BREAK THE LAW 
DIANE E. HOFFMANN* 
The medical profession has, of course, many dedicated people who give of 
themselves and literally sacrifice their own interests for the sake of their 
patients.  The point is that medicine has its share of both angels and 
scoundrels.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In her article, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad 
Law” Claims Seriously, Sandra Johnson focuses on doctors who comply with 
the law despite their belief that the law is “bad,” i.e., causes them to behave in 
ways that are harmful to their patients.2  Physicians who obey laws they claim 
are bad may hurt patients by failing to treat them or treating them 
inappropriately.  They may under-medicate their patients or subject them to 
unnecessary procedures or tests.  These laws may also have a “chilling effect” 
on physician behavior, causing them not only to inadequately treat their own 
patients but also to refuse to see certain types of patients, e.g., those who are 
“the sickest or highest-risk,”3 or to provide patients with certain kinds of 
 
* Professor of Law; Associate Dean for Academic Programs; and Director, Law and Health Care 
Program at the University of Maryland School of Law.  I would like to express my thanks to my 
colleagues Richard Boldt, Sandra Johnson and Jack Schwartz for comments on earlier drafts of 
this article and to research fellow, Susan McCarty, for her invaluable assistance. 
 1. DAVID MECHANIC, MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY 116 (2d ed. 1978), quoted in Paul D. Jesilow 
et al., Medical Criminals: Physicians and White-Collar Offenses, 2 JUST. Q. 149, 163 (1985). 
 2. Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims 
Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973 (2009).  Johnson provides the following examples of bad law 
claims: 
[M]alpractice litigation that makes doctors practice “defensive medicine”; . . . patients’ 
rights that make doctors provide futile care; . . . controlled substances laws that require 
[doctors] to neglect their patients in pain or to deny their patients the sterile injection tools 
that would prevent the spread of disease; . . . antitrust laws that prevent doctors from 
organizing themselves in ways that would produce more cost-effective and accessible 
care; and . . . regulations that impede important medical research. 
Id. at 974–75 (footnotes omitted). 
 3. John Liederbach et al., The Criminalization of Physician Violence: Social Control in 
Transformation?, 18 JUST. Q. 141, 165 (2001). 
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treatment or services.4  Such physicians may be described as overly cautious or 
as “over-complying” with the law.  They stay far away from the line 
demarcating what is legal and illegal.5 
There are a number of reasons why physicians might over-comply with the 
law, e.g., the law’s complexity and uncertainty, the fact that they 
misunderstand the law, or the possibility that they have unique personal 
characteristics that make them more sensitive (i.e., risk averse) to 
entanglements with the law.6  Research on the deterrence value of law has 
shown that “[p]eople who have conventional values or strong social ties are . . . 
easier to deter, possibly because arrest—or other legal action—brings the 
offence to the attention of other (conventional) people who matter to them and 
thereby jeopardise valued social relationships.”7  In the case of physicians, 
such action would also significantly affect their reputation, and thus may lead 
to hypersensitivity to possible arrest for violation of the law. 
 
 4. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Commentary, Abortion Politics: Clinical Freedom, Trust 
in the Judiciary, and the Autonomy of Women, 298 JAMA 1562, 1563 (2007) (arguing that the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124 (2007), will have a chilling effect on physician willingness to perform procedures used to end 
medically dangerous pregnancies); Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug 
Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. 
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 231, 309 (2008) (describing the chilling effect of the Controlled 
Substances Act and its enforcement on physician willingness to treat chronic pain patients or to 
prescribe opioids for pain management); Blaine Harden, Court Rules on Aided Suicide, WASH. 
POST, May 27, 2004, at A2 (stating that the 2001 “Ashcroft Order,” regarding the illegality of 
prescribing controlled substances for assisted suicide, had a chilling effect on Oregon physicians 
carrying out requests under Oregon’s assisted suicide law). 
 5. These physicians practice in a way that is in the 40%–60% range, rather than the 30%–
70% range, of the safe harbor that Professor Johnson describes.  See Johnson, supra note 2, at 
1018–22.  Johnson uses an illustration to show how doctors often operate well inside the “safe 
harbor” range.  She asks the reader to 
assume a range of interventions from 1 to 100, and that the range of appropriate treatment 
lies between 10 to 90.  To retain a margin for prosecutorial or regulatory discretion in 
individual cases, the clinical safe harbor is set to cover behavior in the range of 30 to 70.  
This means that while doctors practicing in the range between 10 and 30 and between 70 
and 90 are engaged in legitimate medical practice, they simply are not guaranteed 
protection from government scrutiny. 
Id. at 1021.  She asserts, “[t]he risk-averse doctor who fears investigation and potential 
prosecution by enforcement agencies and the rational doctor who calculates the risks and benefits 
of choosing to treat one type of patient over another both stay well within the identified safe 
harbors.”  Id. 
 6. See id. at 978 (stating that there has been some research on the training of physicians 
indicating that they have a “heightened sensitivity to shame associated with errors, a refined 
notion of the centrality of character, and the attachment of serious moral content to breaches of 
particular, but not all, standards of behavior”). 
 7. Jonathan P. Shepherd, Criminal Deterrence as a Public Health Strategy, 358 LANCET 
1717, 1719 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
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Physicians who over-comply with the law may also overestimate the 
probability of being identified or captured in a law enforcement net.  Stories in 
the media about physicians who are arrested and prosecuted, that focus on 
arbitrary or prejudicial enforcement, also undoubtedly fuel physician fears of 
the law.8 
While the large majority of physicians operate within the law, there are 
some who do not.  These physicians may not share the same personal traits as 
other physicians that lead to hypersensitivity of being caught for lawbreaking.  
In this essay, I explore why physicians break the law, how law enforcement 
responds when they do, and what, if anything, we can learn from cases about 
physicians who break the law, about the laws they break and their 
enforcement.  In this exploration, I focus on two areas of physician 
lawbreaking: (1) violations of business-related laws (non-clinical), and (2) 
violations of laws relating directly to patient care.  The first area deals 
primarily with physician failure to comply with laws addressing insurance 
fraud; the second, with situations where physicians violate the law in order to 
provide what they believe is clinically appropriate care to their patients. 
I.  PHYSICIANS WHO BREAK FRAUD LAWS 
Some of the most common violations of the law by physicians involve 
insurance fraud, overstepping sexual boundaries, and drug abuse or diversion 
of controlled substances.9  The question of why physicians engage in violations 
of the law in these areas has been underexplored in the literature.10  The 
reasons, no doubt, differ with the type of crime.  Although none of these 
crimes by physicians have been studied extensively, insurance fraud appears to 
be the most common type of lawbreaking by physicians and the crime for 
which there is the most abundant information.  Insurance fraud involves crimes 
 
 8. See, e.g., Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 239–40 (describing the case of Dr. Frank Fisher, 
who spent five months in jail prior to a hearing at which the charges against him for murder were 
dismissed or reduced and later dropped due to insufficient evidence); see also Chad D. Kollas et 
al., Criminal Prosecutions of Physicians Providing Palliative or End-of-Life Care, 11 J. 
PALLIATIVE MED. 233, 235 (2008) (describing the case of Dr. Robert Weitzel, in which the 
prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence). 
 9. See George J. Annas, Medicine, Death, and the Criminal Law, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
527, 527 (1995) (“Criminal charges related to the practice of medicine have primarily involved 
insurance fraud (including Medicare and Medicaid fraud), sexual abuse of patients, or illegal use 
or prescription of controlled substances.”). 
 10. See Jesilow et al., supra note 1, at 149, 151–52 (“Few textbooks on deviance or 
criminology attend to offenses by physicians, probably because of the respect, power, and trust 
that the profession engenders.  In addition, there is little systematic investigative or social science 
work on the range of illegal medical acts.  In part, this results because access to information is 
difficult to obtain, as the strength of the profession has served to protect it from close scrutiny.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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in which physicians knowingly defraud commercial or government insurers, in 
particular, Medicare and Medicaid, by making a false statement or 
representation in connection with payment for services rendered or 
participation in an insurance program.11  The laws governing these behaviors, 
at their most basic level, apply a generally accepted moral value (i.e., do not 
steal) to our current government and commercial health insurance programs. 
Insurance fraud is considered a type of white-collar crime,12 and while 
much of white-collar crime focuses on corporate offenses, these crimes also 
include lawbreaking by professionals.  Perhaps the first person to write about 
physicians as white-collar criminals was Edwin H. Sutherland.  In his 1949 
book, White Collar Crime,13 Sutherland included crimes by doctors, as he 
believed studying their violations of the law could provide “particularly 
important information in assessing why persons who seemingly have no ‘real’ 
or ‘true’ need to enrich themselves nevertheless do so by illegal means.”14  In 
the book, Sutherland listed the types of crimes committed by doctors at the 
time.  They included “illegal sales of alcohol and narcotics, abortion, illegal 
services to underworld criminals, fraudulent reports and testimony in accident 
cases, fraud in income tax returns, extreme instances of unnecessary treatment 
and surgical operations, fake specialists, restriction of competition, and fee-
splitting.”15 
Today, doctors commit white-collar crimes when they take kickbacks on 
referrals or prescriptions, order questionable procedures or inaccurately report 
procedures, overbill patients and insurers, bill for services they have not 
provided, or bill for patients and clinical entities that do not exist.  Empirical 
research on why physicians commit white-collar crime reveals that, for the 
most part, it is for the same reasons that other professionals do: the belief, 
which is in large part true, that the probability of getting caught is low,16 the 
opportunity is readily available, and the reward is potentially great.  White-
collar crimes, such as fraud, are also relatively easy to hide and hard to 
 
 11. Such false billing involving federal health care plans constitutes a federal crime and, in 
most cases, a felony.  See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 1009 (5th ed. 2004). 
 12. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME 317 (Lawrence M. Salinger 
ed., 2005). 
 13. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949). 
 14. Jesilow et al., supra note 1, at 152 (discussing Sutherland’s view on doctors’ violations 
of the law).  The authors further state that “Sutherland was also interested in decimating 
contemporary theories which insisted that Freudian complexes, immigrant status, and poverty 
‘caused’ crime: doctors and other white-collar criminals, he noted, rarely fell into such 
categories.”  Id. 
 15. SUTHERLAND, supra note 13, at 12. 
 16. Relative to their incidence, arrests are very rarely made.  White-collar crime is rarely 
prosecuted, and individuals who are prosecuted are rarely convicted.  ERICH GOODE, DEVIANT 
BEHAVIOR 218–19 (8th ed. 2008). 
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detect.17  The acts tend to “be made up of complex, sophisticated, and 
relatively technical actions” and “intermingled with legitimate behavior.”18 
In a 1991 JAMA article, Fraud by Physicians Against Medicaid,19 the 
authors report on their interviews of over forty physicians who ran afoul of the 
Medicaid fraud and abuse laws.  They consistently found that the physicians 
viewed the violation as easy—there was no known victim, only an impersonal 
billing process—and they simply had to check a procedure on a form that was 
more expensive than the procedure actually performed, or inflate the amount of 
time they spent with a patient.20 
Physicians, like other professionals, also engage in white-collar crimes for 
personal reasons such as striving to achieve a certain lifestyle or because of an 
economic or family crisis. The literature indicates that white-collar criminals 
are motivated by two factors: economic difficulty and greed.21  Often the 
behavior that enables a physician to engage in fraud is partially learned from 
others in the profession as “professional values may effectively neutralize [the 
doctor’s] conflicts of conscience.”22  In justifying Medicaid fraud, for example, 
some physicians said they did it to make back what was owed them, alluding to 
the low Medicaid reimbursement rates.23  Moreover, “occupational norms may 
support an attitude on the part of some professionals that they are ‘above the 
law.’”24 
Interviews with physicians prosecuted for Medicaid fraud revealed a group 
of people reluctant to say that greed was the reason for their behavior; they 
were more likely to attribute it to carelessness and to see themselves as 
“sacrificial lambs hung out to dry” by disgruntled employees, “stupid laws,” or 
“bureaucratic nonsense.”25  They also felt that the Medicaid rules, which can 
be “mercilessly nitpicking,” stood “in the way of important and humane 
service demands.”26  They resented the outside control of these regulations on 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Paul Jesilow et al., Fraud by Physicians Against Medicaid, 266 JAMA 3318 (1991). 
 20. Id.  The authors provide examples of physicians who billed 4800 hours in a year, who 
billed for services to persons who were dead, or billed for services when they were on vacation.  
Id. at 3319.  One physician performed abortions on women who were not pregnant and in one 
case on a woman who had had a hysterectomy.  Id. 
 21. See ALEX THIO, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 343–44 (6th ed. 2001) (discussing the causes of 
white-collar crime). 
 22. Jesilow et al., supra note 19, at 3321. 
 23. Id. at 3320. 
 24. See PAUL JESILOW ET AL., PRESCRIPTION FOR PROFIT: HOW DOCTORS DEFRAUD 
MEDICAID (1993), as reprinted in ABOUT CRIMINALS 156 (Mark Pogrebin ed., 2004) (“A 
subculture of medical delinquency . . . arises, thrives, and grows in large part because of the 
tension between bureaucratic regulation and professional norms of autonomy.”). 
 25. Jesilow et al., supra note 19, at 3320. 
 26. JESILOW ET AL., supra note 24, at 150. 
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their independence and autonomy.27  An example given by one physician 
prosecuted for Medicaid fraud was his treatment “of a fourteen-year-old girl 
who was having her third abortion in less than six months.  He had given the 
girl birth control pills, but she obviously hadn’t taken them.  When she came 
back for the third abortion, he coaxed her into allowing him to insert an IUD,” 
telling her he could insert it right after he performed the abortion.28  Medicaid 
would not pay for the IUD insertion because the IUD was “done at the same 
time as the abortion.”29  The physician “subsequently got into difficulty in part 
by falsifying the dates that he did the two procedures.”30 
Clearly, this physician viewed the law that prevented him from billing for 
the procedure under these circumstances as “bad law.”  The rule was 
established in light of the fact that when the two covered procedures are 
performed together the cost to the physician of the insertion of the IUD is 
nominal—”the small cost of the IUD and the minimal extra time to insert it.”31  
Before the advent of Medicaid, the physician might have performed such a 
service for free, yet, in this case, he was not willing to forgo the additional 
small expense of the IUD insertion.  Instead, he felt cheated because he was 
unable to charge for the full cost of the procedure (which included a new office 
visit).32  He chose to frame the issue as one in which his patient would be 
harmed if he required her to come back for a second visit as she would be 
unlikely to return and might become pregnant again.33 
The view that the Medicaid rules and their enforcement are unfair and 
irrational was a common perspective among those interviewed.  One 
respondent “insisted that Medicaid not only invited but demanded cheating.”34  
He appeared to resent the fact that the enforcers were not “medical people” and 
described them as knowing “nothing about the services being provided.”35  He 
defended his actions by saying: 
They’ve built in systems that either ask for somebody to cheat . . . or to cheat 
the patient on the type of care that’s provided.  You put somebody in the 
position where lying is the most reasonable course, and they will lie.  The 
 
 27. See id. at 156. 
 28. Id. at 153. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Jesilow, supra note 19, at 3320. 
 31. JESILOW ET AL., supra note 24, at 154. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 153.  The case description does not indicate whether the alleged wrongdoing 
occurred before or after the 1976 Hyde Amendment, which prohibited Medicaid payment for 
abortion except under narrow circumstances.  See Hyde Amendment of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 
§ 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(1), (7) (2000)).  Most 
likely, however, it occurred prior to 1976 when many states covered abortions under Medicaid. 
 34. JESILOW ET AL., supra note 24, at 154. 
 35. Id. 
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patients will lie; the doctor may even lie on what they say about what 
happened.36 
Physicians may obtain their views about compliance with the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs as early as medical school.  In a study of medical 
student attitudes toward physicians who committed Medicare or Medicaid 
fraud, Keenan et al. gave students a series of hypotheticals, based on real cases, 
in which physicians violated the fraud and abuse laws and asked them what 
sort of sanctions the physicians should receive for their violations of the law.37  
Thirty-five percent (35%) of the respondents blamed the government 
programs, rather than the physicians, for violation of the program rules.38  The 
students cited several programmatic features as contributors to physicians’ 
fraudulent behavior.  These included the low level of reimbursement, the 
paperwork and bureaucracy, and the programs’ inefficiency.39  By blaming the 
programs, the students shifted the responsibility for the wrongful acts away 
from the physicians and toward the flaws of the programs themselves.40  The 
authors concluded that “[s]tudents believed that the regulations and policies 
governing these programs actually promoted fraud and abuse among 
physicians, despite the voluntary nature of physician participation.”41 
Physicians may also engage in private insurance fraud, which can be the 
basis of criminal arrest and prosecution under various state laws42 as well as 
under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA).43  In the 1990s, due to the use of utilization review in managed care 
plans, many physicians reported pressure to alter a patient’s medical records to 
support insurance coverage for the patient’s treatment.  In a survey of over 700 
physicians, Wynia et al. sought to determine “whether financial pressures, 
practice characteristics, and/or . . . personal characteristics influence 
physicians’ use of deception with third party payers.”44  The survey was 
 
 36. Id. at 155. 
 37. Constance E. Keenan et al., Medical Students’ Attitudes on Physician Fraud and Abuse 
in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 60 J. MED. EDUC. 167 (1985). 
 38. Id. at 172. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Illinois Insurance Claims Fraud Prevention Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
92/1 to 92/45 (2002); New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:33A-1 
to -30 (West 1994 & Supp. 2008). 
 43. Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
§§ 241–50, 110 Stat. 1936, 2016 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 44. M. Wynia et al., Physician Responses to Utilization Review Pressures: Results of a 
National Physician Survey, in SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE ASS’N HEALTH SERVICES 
RESEARCH ANNUAL MEETING JUNE 21–23 1998, at 244 (1999) [hereinafter Wynia, Physician 
Responses to Utilization Review Pressures], available at http://gateway.nlm.nih.gov/Meeting 
Abstracts/ma?f=102193686.html.  The study results were published in further detail in JAMA.  
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conducted in 1998 and the results were reported at a 1999 meeting of the 
Association of Health Services Researchers.  Of the 61% who responded, 
28% had exaggerated the severity of patients’ conditions to help them avoid 
early discharge from the hospital; 23% had changed official (billing) diagnoses 
to help patients secure coverage for needed treatments or services; and 9% had 
reported symptoms that patients did not actually have to help them secure 
coverage for needed treatments.45 
Those physicians who engaged in these deceptive practices were more likely 
than their colleagues to be “less satisfied with medical practice, less financially 
secure, . . . less likely to report having enough time during patient visits, more 
likely to find insurance company intrusions annoying, and more likely to 
believe that ‘gaming the system’ for patients was necessary to provide high 
quality care.”46  Moreover, these physicians were not swayed by the threat of 
prosecution as they believed their actions were necessary for the health of their 
patients.  Interestingly, while a large majority of respondents (87%) believed 
that all physicians had a responsibility to try to contain health care costs, 55% 
said “they would be more aggressive in cost control efforts if they knew that 
money saved would go towards serving more needy patients.”47 
While fraud laws are an effort to protect the public purse and insurance 
monies that are part of a communal fund, and they may also protect patients 
(e.g., from unnecessary procedures), physicians claim complying with them 
may hurt patients.  This claim often reflects a misconception, however, when it 
is not compliance with the fraud laws that hurts patients but compliance with 
some other law, regulation, or policy.  For example, physicians may violate 
commercial insurance fraud regulations because they disagree with the 
insurance policies or the interpretation of the policies by the insurance 
company.  Most often this occurs when it is the physician’s medical opinion 
that the proposed treatment or continued treatment is medically necessary.  In 
the context of Medicare and Medicaid fraud, it is the billing rules that some 
physicians argue encourage care that harms patients, e.g., rules that encourage 
physicians to have patients come back for a second visit in order to charge for 
a procedure that could be done during the first visit.48 
 
Matthew K. Wynia et al., Physician Manipulation of Reimbursement Rules for Patients: Between 
a Rock and a Hard Place, 283 JAMA 1858, 1861 (2000) [hereinafter Wynia, Physician 
Manipulation of Reimbursement Rules for Patients]. 
 45. Wynia, Physician Responses to Utilization Review Pressures, supra note 44, at 244. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule 
for Calendar Year 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 70116, 70261 (Nov. 21, 2005) (stating that the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reimburses a same-visit, second procedure at 50% of the 
fee schedule rate, and that “the multiple procedure payment reduction for surgery . . . has been a 
longstanding policy”). 
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II.  HOW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TREATS PHYSICIANS WHO VIOLATE 
FRAUD LAWS 
When physicians intentionally violate the fraud laws, most of us would 
agree that they should be punished, perhaps more harshly than 
nonprofessionals who commit more routine street-crimes, given their 
privileged position in society.  Yet white-collar criminals, more broadly, are 
perceived to be treated less harshly than nonprofessionals.  There is little data, 
however, to determine whether that perception is valid.49  Whether or not 
physicians who commit fraud are treated more or less harshly by the criminal 
justice system requires information about several components of the system: at 
the front end, whether physicians are arrested and prosecuted more frequently 
than non-physicians engaging in similar crimes; and at the back end, whether 
physicians are convicted more or less frequently and whether they are 
sanctioned more or less harshly than non-physicians committing similar 
crimes. 
As regards law enforcement efforts to identify and arrest physicians who 
engage in fraud, considerable resources are being used to detect and combat 
medical fraud.  At the federal level, such efforts by the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) were 
“consolidated and strengthened” by the passage of HIPAA.50  In enacting 
HIPAA, Congress directed the Secretary of DHHS and the Attorney General to 
establish a “joint Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program and created a 
dedicated funding stream for health care fraud and abuse control activities.”51  
Resources devoted to Medicaid fraud control at the state level have also 
increased.52  The additional resources for detection of physicians engaging in 
 
 49. In fact, there is some evidence to show the opposite.  Based on a vignette study, Rosoff 
found that “for serious offenses (homicides not related to medical practice), respondents allocate 
harsher verdicts to physicians with higher-status specialties.” Liederbach et al., supra note 3, at 
163 (citing Stephen M. Rosoff, Physicians as Criminal Defendants: Specialty, Sanctions, and 
Status Liability, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (1989)).  Also, Shaw and Skolnick found that an 
offender’s status may “increase harshness [of the sanction] when the [offense] is related to 
professional practice (an altercation in the office with a patient).”  Id. (citing Jerry I. Shaw & Paul 
Skolnick, When Is Defendant Status a Shield or a Liability?: Clarification and Extension, 20 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431 (1996)). 
 50. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH 
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1998 (1999), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/98hipaa_ar.htm [hereinafter DHHS & DOJ, ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 51. Budgeting to Fight Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Budget, 110th Cong. 8 (July 17, 2007) (statement of Mike O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Department 
of Health & Human Services). 
 52. Jeffrey Blumengold & Christopher Panczner, ForThoughts—Edition 5: The Shifting 
Landscape of Health Care Fraud and Regulatory Compliance, DELOITTE, 
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,cid%253D218791,00.html (last visited May 12, 2009). 
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fraud and abuse have significantly increased the number of physician arrests 
and prosecutions.53 
While insurance fraud continues to be difficult to detect, law enforcement 
agents are assisted in their efforts by False Claims Act relators or “whistle-
blowers.”54  In some cases, the relator may be a prior employee, in others he or 
she may be a patient.  Relators are entitled to a percentage of the government’s 
recovery and therefore have an incentive to come forth with information.55  
More recently, law enforcement agencies have created programs to “ferret out 
fraud through data matching, data mining, and . . . the hiring of contractors to 
go out as third parties to look for fraud, waste, abuse, or errors.”56 
In order to determine whether physicians are treated differently than 
nonprofessionals once they are arrested, we would need to know whether they 
are more or less likely to be prosecuted and convicted.  Writing twenty-five 
years ago, Jesilow, Pontell, and Geis asserted that “[t]he status of doctors 
preclude[d] the rough and insensitive treatment often accorded to street 
offenders,”57 and quoted a federal agent in support of their observation who 
said: 
U.S. attorneys are extraordinarily kind to doctors, because even if they are 
crooks, theoretically they’re still providing some useful services for the 
community. . . . There’s a double standard for doctors because there aren’t 
many other categories of white-collar criminals that are looked upon as a 
community of people who save lives.58 
Today, that does not appear to be the case, at least with respect to health care 
fraud.  According to a joint annual report by DHHS and DOJ, “[f]ederal 
prosecutors filed 322 criminal health care fraud cases in 1998—a 14 percent 
increase over the previous year.”59  During that same year, “326 defendants 
 
 53. See RONALD T. LIBBY, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MEDICINE: AMERICA’S WAR ON 
DOCTORS 40 (2008) (“The number of fraud investigators in the OIG of HHS increased by 40 
percent from 1998 to 2005.  In 1998, there were 260 auditors and 136 criminal investigators. In 
2006, there were 1,500 investigators and attorneys.”).  In addition, “FBI health fraud 
investigations increased by more than 400 percent from 591 in 1992 to 2,547 cases in 2005.”  Id. 
 54. See Joan H. Krause, A Patient-Centered Approach to Health Care Fraud Recovery, 96 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 585 (2006) (discussing the False Claims Act’s status as the 
“centerpiece of the government’s anti-fraud efforts”). 
 55. See id. (noting that relators can “retain fifteen to thirty percent of the proceeds”).  See 
also U.S. DEP’T OF  HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2007 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2007.pdf (reporting that $122 million in recovered 
funds were awarded to relators in fiscal year 2007). 
 56. Blumengold & Panczner, supra note 52. 
 57. Jesilow et al., supra note 1, at 161. 
 58. Id. (alteration in original). 
 59. See DHHS & DOJ, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] PHYSICIANS WHO BREAK THE LAW 1059 
were convicted of health care fraud-related crimes.”60  A decade later, “[i]n 
fiscal year 2007, the federal government alone initiated 878 criminal . . . 
investigations . . . and was successful in obtaining 560 criminal convictions.”61 
While in many cases the physicians enter into a plea bargain with the 
prosecutor, if the case goes to trial, often the outcome is based on the 
sympathies of the jury and the judge.  As regards whether white-collar 
criminals (not physicians specifically) are incarcerated more or less frequently 
than others, in 2002 Paul Rosenzweig, a Senior Research Fellow in the Center 
for Legal and Judicial Studies at the Heritage Foundation, testified on the 
question before the Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs.62  Based on an 
empirical study of past crimes, he found that when one controls for non-
discretionary sentencing (i.e., takes out crimes that were subject to federal 
sentencing guidelines and just looks at those where judges had discretion as 
between incarceration and a non-jail alternative) the results are equivocal—
professionals have not been treated less harshly or more harshly than others.63  
Lengths of prison sentences, however, have been largely determined by the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were put in place to address sentencing 
disparities.  In establishing the Guidelines, the Federal Sentencing Commission 
looked at past practices and collected data on more than 40,000 cases.64  While 
the Commission was guided by historical data, it chose to depart from past 
practices in crimes of an economic or regulatory nature, as those crimes had 
been punished “less severely than other apparently equivalent behavior.”65  
Consequently, the Guidelines made “an effort to upgrade the penalties for 
regulatory and economic, white-collar offenses.”66  In addition, Rosenzweig 
found that “courts d[id] not appear to depart from the [federal sentencing] 
guidelines with any greater frequency in white-collar cases than in street-crime 
cases.”67 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Blumengold & Panczner, supra note 52. 
 62. Penalties for White Collar Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 144 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenzweig Testimony] 
(testimony of Paul Rosenzweig, Senior Legal Research Fellow, Center for Legal and Judicial 
Studies, The Heritage Foundation). 
 63. Id. at 148. 
 64. Id. at 151. 
 65. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66. Id.; see also Liederbach et al., supra note 3, at 147 (stating that historical inequities in 
the treatment of white-collar and street-crimes have led to a “commitment to equal treatment 
under the law”). 
 67. Rosenzweig Testimony, supra note 62, at 150.  Rosenzweig’s analysis was based on 
decisions made before 2005, when the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), found that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as originally constituted violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury and struck down provisions of the law making them mandatory.  
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory—judges are not required to follow them but 
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There is no specific data as to whether physicians are incarcerated with any 
more frequency than non-physicians or whether they are subject to shorter or 
longer prison terms.  However, physicians who violate fraud laws today are 
subject to more significant penalties than was the case ten to twelve years 
ago—”[s]ince 1996, the fines and prison sentences for medical doctors have 
dramatically increased.  The amount of the fraud is now tripled plus $10,000 is 
added for each instance of overbilling.”68  This increase in fines has significant 
implications.  Prosecutors often “use the federal . . . sentencing guidelines to 
intimidate doctors into pleading guilty to felonies and paying huge fines in 
exchange for a reduced prison sentence.”69  Based on this data, it appears that 
physicians who break fraud laws are treated at least comparably to, and 
arguably more harshly than, those who commit common law fraud.70 
Moreover, it appears that some physicians are prosecuted for unintentional 
violations of the law.  Physicians, for example, who bill Medicare for lab tests 
that are not recognized by Medicare, or who bill for a procedure or service 
using the wrong HCPCS/CPT code,71 may be deemed to have engaged in a 
criminal offense.72  The absence of intent is not determinative.  While the 
 
must use them as a reference.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to 
apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when 
sentencing.”). Prior to Booker, judges were able to depart from the Guidelines only under 
specified circumstances, most notably when a defendant provided substantial assistance to the 
prosecution.  See LISA M. SEGHETTI & ALISON M. SMITH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS, at 
CRS-15 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32766.pdf. 
 68. LIBBY, supra note 53, at 25.  Violations of the False Claims Act may include criminal 
prosecution as well as civil and administrative actions and penalties.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286–287 
(2006) (providing for fines and prison sentences of up to five years for fraud against the 
government and up to ten years for conspiracy to defraud).  Often both criminal and civil charges 
are brought. The statutory fines are designated under the civil provisions of the False Claims Act.  
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).  The penalties of $5,000 to $10,000 per offense have been 
adjusted upward to account for inflation.  See Civil Monetary Policies Inflation Adjustment, 28 
C.F.R. § 85.3(9) (2008). 
 69. LIBBY, supra note 53, at 25. 
 70. Other white-collar fraud committed in the business setting is also subject to harsh 
penalties.  Revisions to the Sentencing Guidelines, including significant increases in prison 
sentences and fines, for individuals and corporations convicted of white-collar and financial 
crimes were made in response to a congressional directive in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  See 
Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 721, 726–27 (2005). 
 71. HCPCS/CPT codes are codes assigned by Medicare and other insurers to each medical 
service performed by a physician for purposes of uniformity of reimbursement. 
 72. See, e.g., United States v. Janati, No. 05-4255, 2007 WL 2197065, at **1 (4th Cir. Aug. 
1, 2007) (physician convicted of criminal fraud for using wrong code for office visits).  Correctly 
coding claims is apparently quite difficult.  See Mitchell S. King et al., Accuracy of CPT 
Evaluation and Management Coding by Family Physicians, 14 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 184, 
188 (2001) (noting the “substantial” coding error rate in a survey of 600 physicians). 
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mental state required to find criminal liability under the False Claims Act is a 
“knowing” violation, i.e., the physician knowingly submitted a false claim,73 
the knowledge standard may be satisfied by a showing of “conscious 
avoidance” of knowledge of the truth or “reckless disregard” for the truth.74  In 
addition, under the False Claims Act, civil penalties may be imposed when a 
physician “acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the 
information; or acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the 
information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.”75 
Prosecutors, in a number of cases, have stretched the boundaries of 
“reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information” and courts have 
differed in the interpretation of the phrase, with some equating it with 
“aggravated gross negligence”76 and others requiring something closer to 
intentional harm.  Because it is often difficult to determine whether a physician 
intentionally submitted a false claim or committed an error, physicians have 
been criminally charged when they mistakenly submit the wrong billing code 
for a patient.  In a recent case, a federal judge found that the government’s 
criminal fraud case against a physician was frivolous because the government 
failed to provide evidence of the defendant’s requisite mental state.77  The 
defendant was awarded nearly $300,000 in legal fees.78  A criminal law 
professor who worked with the defendant on the case commented that often in 
these cases “[the government] is just looking at CPT code usage and anybody 
out on the tail of the distribution is targeted for criminal prosecution” even if 
there is no evidence of intentional wrongdoing.79  Doctors in these cases often 
 
 73. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (providing criminal liability for any claim, or claims, presented to 
the U.S. Government that is “knowing[ly] . . . false, fictitious, or fraudulent”).  Cf. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729 (providing civil liability for false claims “knowingly” presented to the government for 
payment or approval); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (providing criminal liability for false claims 
“knowingly” submitted to a health care benefit program). 
 74. See United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255, 258 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding jury 
instructions interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 287, which permitted the jurors to “infer knowledge from a 
combination of suspicion and indifference to the truth” (emphasis omitted)); United States v. 
Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 822 (11th Cir. 1984) (approving the use of a “conscious avoidance” jury 
instruction in medical fraud case against optician). 
 75. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 941–42 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 77. See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Judge Rules Criminal Fraud Case Against Idaho Doctor Is 
Frivolous, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 20, 2007, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/08/20/ 
gvsb0820.htm. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jeffrey S. Parker, Professor of Law, George Mason 
University) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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settle “even when they did nothing wrong, because the financial stakes are so 
high,” and sometimes they face significant jail time.80 
III.  PHYSICIANS WHO BREAK LAWS INVOLVING PATIENT CARE 
A second category of laws that physicians break govern clinical practice 
and patient treatment rather than business-related activities.  Examples range 
from prescribing opioids for chronic pain patients or medical marijuana for 
cancer patients to helping a terminally ill patient end his or her life. 
In the case of physicians who break the law regarding prescribing of 
opioids, reasons may vary from greed to a desire to appropriately treat their 
patients’ pain.  Under the Controlled Substances Act81 (CSA), to find a 
physician guilty of criminal violation of the law for prescribing controlled 
substances, the prosecution must prove that the physician knowingly or 
intentionally prescribed outside “the usual course of . . . professional practice” 
or not for a “legitimate medical purpose.”82  In some cases, physicians 
intentionally violate the law by knowingly prescribing without a medical 
purpose.  Generally, the purpose of such prescribing is monetary gain or sexual 
favors; physicians demand such benefits in exchange for the prescription.  The 
“patient” may need the drug to feed an addiction or may sell it on the street.  In 
these circumstances, law enforcement is ideally swift and harsh.83 
On the other hand, physicians may violate the CSA in order to treat their 
patients.  In these cases, they may believe they are complying with the law as 
they are prescribing for a legitimate medical purpose and within, what they 
believe, is the usual course of professional practice.  Dozens of physicians 
have been arrested for what they argue is appropriate treatment of chronic pain 
patients.84  An example is Dr. William Hurwitz.  Hurwitz, who practiced in 
northern Virginia, was arrested for prescribing large dosages of opioids that 
prosecutors alleged were related to several deaths.85  Yet, many of his patients 
asserted that he had greatly improved the quality of their lives, and a number of 
 
 80. Id. (citing Robert S. Salcido, attorney in Washington, D.C. and former Justice 
Department civil fraud lawyer); see also Roccy DeFrancesco, Surplus Medicare Fraud Insurance, 
PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIGEST, July 2005, http://www.physiciansnews.com/finance/705.html. 
 81. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006). 
 82. See 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2008). 
 83. See Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 236–38 (providing statistics and description of a number 
of cases in which physicians have been investigated, arrested, and prosecuted for prescribing 
controlled substances). 
 84. See id. at 239–56 (describing the cases of Drs. Frank Fisher, Cecil Knox, William 
Hurwitz, Jeri Hassman, and Ronald McIver). 
 85. Id. at 246. 
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pain experts described him as a caring physician.86  Hurwitz was initially 
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, despite the prosecution’s argument 
that he should receive a life sentence.87  The sentence was subsequently 
reduced to fifty-seven months after he successfully appealed the initial 
conviction on the grounds that the court wrongly “instructed the jury that it 
could not consider Hurwitz’s ‘good faith’ in his prescribing.”88 
Physicians have also been arrested and prosecuted in California for 
growing and dispensing marijuana for cancer and HIV patients.  California 
passed the country’s first law permitting physicians to “prescribe” marijuana 
for medical purposes in 1996.89  The law, also known as Proposition 215, 
requires patients who wish to grow or buy marijuana to treat their symptoms to 
obtain written or oral authorization from their physician.90  Such patients and 
their designated primary care givers are protected from criminal prosecution 
under California law for obtaining, possessing, or cultivating marijuana for 
patients’ personal medical use.  Physicians who comply with the state law, 
however, can be prosecuted for violation of the federal CSA, which categorizes 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug that cannot lawfully be prescribed for any 
reason.91  According to medical marijuana advocates, an estimated 1500 
physicians in California, “mostly oncologists and AIDS specialists,” have 
authorized medical marijuana for a patient.92  However, most of the 
authorizations have been from a small group of about a dozen physicians.93  In 
2005, Dr. Mollie Fry was arrested by federal drug agents for growing 
marijuana and issuing written authorizations to many patients.94  Fry, “a cancer 
survivor who learned about the benefits of medical marijuana while enduring 
chemotherapy and a double mastectomy,”95 set up a practice in a small town in 
 
 86. One physician said he was “doing heroic things for his patients.”  Id. at 247 (quoting Dr. 
James Campbell, Professor of Neurosurgery and Director of the Blaustein Pain Treatment Center 
at Johns Hopkins University). 
 87. Id. at 249. 
 88. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 249. 
 89. California Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 
(West Supp. 2009). 
 90. Id. § 11362.5(d). 
 91. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 92. Lisa Leff, Calif. ‘Pot Docs’ Put Selves at Risk, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Nov. 5, 2006, 
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/04/AR2006110400516_pf.html. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Dean E. Murphy, Arrests Follow Searches in Medical Marijuana Raids, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 23, 2005, at A12 (noting that Fry wrote a recommendation for marijuana to an undercover 
federal agent, which Fry’s husband, Dale Schafer, filled). 
 95. New Book Exposes the First Federal Trial of a Medical Marijuana Doctor, MED. 
MARIJUANA AM., Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.medicalmarijuanaofamerica.com/content/view/ 
246/110/ (reviewing VANESSA NELSON, COOL MADNESS: THE TRIAL OF DR. MOLLIE FRY AND 
DALE SCHAFER (2008)). 
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northern California “and began recommending medical marijuana to her 
patients in accordance with state law.”96  Under federal law, Fry was able to 
recommend marijuana use to her patients97 but was not able to grow it for her 
patients or for herself.98  Fry believed that she was doing the right thing for her 
patients and was willing to go to jail for it.99  She was sentenced to a five year 
prison sentence, the minimum sentence based on the volume of marijuana that 
she had cultivated.100  Judge Damrell, in sentencing the defendant, stated that 
he took “no pleasure in imposing [the] sentence,”101 implying that the 
recommended five-year sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines did 
not seem appropriate in the case. 
In these and other cases involving patient care, physicians may 
intentionally or knowingly break the law because they believe it is in their 
patient’s best interest to do so or because such action is consistent with their 
professional norms.  They perceive complying with the law as breaching their 
duty to their patients as well as violating their autonomy and contravening their 
judgment as to what is the right thing to do.102  Their behavior is consistent 
with 
[n]ormative theories of compliance with law [which] hold that people obey the 
law because they believe it is right to do so.  This sense of rightness may arise 
because the behavior required by the law is consistent with the individual’s 
own sense of right and wrong, or from a sense that the law is the product of a 
“legitimate” or fair authority that is entitled to obedience.103 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that physicians who 
recommend the use of cannabis to patients as specified under California law are protected by the 
First Amendment). 
 98. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (holding 
that there is no medical necessity exception to the CSA’s prohibition against manufacturing and 
distributing cannabis). 
 99. See Leff, supra note 92 (quoting Fry as saying, “What did I take an oath to do? To do no 
harm and to alleviate pain and suffering . . . I’m going to be true to my oath, and I’m even willing 
to go to prison for it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 100. Medical Marijuana: California Dr. Molly [sic] Fry Sentenced to Five Years, DRUG WAR 
CHRON., Mar. 28, 2008, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/529/molly_fry_sentenced_five_ 
years_medical_marijuana. 
 101. News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., California Doctor-Lawyer Couple Get 
Five Years for Growing and Selling Marijuana (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/ 
states/newsrel/sanfran032008.html (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting the prosecution 
argued that Fry and her husband sold the marijuana as a money making scheme rather than to 
treat patients). 
 102. See Kent Greenawalt, Commentary, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 710, 718 (1995) (“The most serious breach of someone’s autonomy involves 
coercion that contravenes that person’s own rational, reflective judgment.”). 
 103. Zita Lazzarini et al., Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk Behavior, 30 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 239, 249 (2002) (citing T. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); 
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In these cases, physicians are not complying with the law because they 
disagree normatively with its requirements.  Furthermore, they may distrust the 
government’s judgments as to what is in their own interest as well as in their 
patients’ best interest.104 
Physician advocates might label these actions by physicians as “civil 
disobedience.”  The American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical 
Ethics actually condones civil disobedience in some circumstances, stating: 
Ethical values and legal principles are usually closely related, but ethical 
obligations typically exceed legal duties. In some cases, the law mandates 
unethical conduct.  In general, when physicians believe a law is unjust, they 
should work to change the law.  In exceptional circumstances of unjust laws, 
ethical responsibilities should supersede legal obligations.105 
While some physicians who break the law may engage in “true” civil 
disobedience, technically, most physicians who break the law do so because 
they perceive it as bad for their patients, and thus are not engaging in what is 
more traditionally defined as civil disobedience.  In an effort to distinguish 
civil disobedience from other forms of lawbreaking, Childress constructed a 
framework for moral analysis of illegal action.106  He contrasts features of 
lawbreaking that are more or less morally justifiable.107  Acts, for example, that 
are open and public, nonviolent, and justified by higher law or conscience, are 
generally less morally culpable than those that are clandestine, evasive of law 
enforcement, and violent.108  True civil disobedience, according to Childress, is 
a nonviolent act publicly performed for the purpose of protesting a law or 
 
Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority 
Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (2001)). 
 104. See Greenawalt, supra note 102, at 719 (“Exactly how much paternalism people will 
countenance depends on how strongly they rate the value of autonomy and to what degree they 
trust the judgments of the government as to what is in their self-interests.”). 
 105. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: THE RELATION OF LAW AND ETHICS Op. 
1.02; see also Chalmers C. Clark, Letter to the Editor, Civil Disobedience: The Devil Is in the 
Details, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2005, at 4 (responding to Robert Macauley, The 
Hippocratic Underground: Civil Disobedience and Health Care Reform, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 38) (“As a public trust, the medical profession has a lofty responsibility 
to respect law, but respect for law does not imply slavishness.  The higher duty of the profession, 
according to its social contract, is to the priority of patient benefit.  The medical profession is a 
socially endowed moral autonomy . . . . [A]s public trust diminishes, professional autonomy 
likewise declines.  In service of the ongoing need for public persuasion, laws or policies that cut 
against patient benefit must be strenuously resisted—through proper channels—yet indeed, as last 
resort, the laws must be broken.”). 
 106. James F. Childress, Civil Disobedience, Conscientious Objection, and Evasive 
Noncompliance: A Framework for the Analysis and Assessment of Illegal Actions in Health Care, 
10 J. MED. & PHIL. 63, 65 (1985). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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government policy, where the wrongdoer is willing to undergo arrest and 
prosecution.109 
Childress distinguished civil disobedience from “conscientious objection” 
and “evasive noncompliance.”110  Conscientious objection is a refusal to obey 
based on personal moral beliefs rather than on a belief that the law should be 
changed—a “moral-political” justification.111  Unlike civil disobedience, 
evasive noncompliance is not done overtly or submissively; it is covert and 
evasive.112  Physician lawbreaking may fall into any of these three categories 
depending on its specific elements. 
When physicians break law they view as harmful to their patients, the acts 
are nonviolent but are generally not done openly as doing so would breach 
patient confidentiality and privacy.  In these cases, doctors are violating the 
law primarily so that they can assist their patients or practice what they think is 
good medicine.  This may be both a matter of conscience and pragmatic.  
Physicians no doubt disagree with the law they are violating and may think it 
should be changed, but they may not be engaged in formal actions to change 
the law.  In some cases, physicians do not want to change the law but believe 
that in a specific case, e.g., euthanasia, the law should not apply.  In these 
cases, Childress would categorize the physician’s actions as conscientious 
objection.113  Most physicians, although not all, are not submissive to arrest 
and punishment; nor are they typically evasive, i.e., they do not run from the 
law and the illegal acts they perform may be done in the presence of other 
health care providers.  Some physicians may also underestimate the legal risk 
associated with their actions.  Under Childress’s typology of dissent, 
physicians who break what they believe to be bad law but do not do so openly 
or submissively, would be committing evasive noncompliance.114 
True civil disobedience in health care does occur, although it is relatively 
rare.  For example, the actions of Dr. Jack Kevorkian would appear to meet the 
traditional definition of civil disobedience.  Kevorkian engaged in a nonviolent 
act (assisting his patients terminate their lives),115 openly and, in at least one 
 
 109. See id. at 66; see also Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil 
Disobedience and the Rule of Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2083 (2007) (proposing a doctrinal 
definition of civil disobedience). 
 110. Childress, supra note106, at 67–69. 
 111. Id. at 68. 
 112. Id. at 68–69. 
 113. See id. at 68 (defining “conscientious objection” as “public, nonviolent, and submissive 
violations of law based on personal-moral . . . convictions and intended primarily to witness to 
those principles or values”). 
 114. See id. at 68–69 (defining “evasive noncompliance” as “illegal action [that] is both 
covert and evasive”). 
 115. See Childress, supra note106, at 75 (defining “violence as intentional and unauthorized 
harm or injury to a person against his/her will,” and noting that “mercy killing,” although an 
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case, publicly, for the purpose of changing the law regarding physician-
assisted suicide.116  Dr. Timothy Quill also, arguably, committed civil 
disobedience when he published an article in the New England Journal of 
Medicine admitting that he had assisted a patient end her life.117  In the area of 
reproductive rights, Dr. C. Lee Buxton, a professor at Yale School of 
Medicine, and Estelle Griswold, then executive director of the Planned 
Parenthood League of Connecticut, engaged in civil disobedience when they 
opened a birth control clinic in New Haven, Connecticut, intending to 
challenge the validity of a Connecticut statute that banned prescribing of oral 
contraceptives.118 
In addition to violation of the laws regarding prescribing controlled 
substances, i.e., opioids and marijuana, there are a number of cases where 
physicians have broken or continue to break the law because they view it as 
harmful to their patients.  For example, prior to Roe v. Wade,119 there was 
widespread violation of the laws prohibiting abortion.120  In 1955, Planned 
Parenthood organized a conference on abortion in the United States where 
conferees speculated that there could be between 200,000 and 1.2 million 
abortions performed annually.121  Clearly, it was not an area where many 
doctors were being prosecuted or feared prosecution. 
In these cases, physicians felt compelled to perform “abortions for 
pregnant women who might otherwise resort to dangerous, back-alley 
procedures,” and also because they wanted to honor their patient’s self-
 
intentional act, does not qualify as a violent act unless “it intentionally inflicts a harm or injury on 
a person against that person’s will”). 
 116. In a 1998 broadcast of 60 Minutes, Kevorkian permitted the airing of a videotape 
showing him assisting Thomas Youk, a fifty-two year old male in the final stages of ALS, end his 
life.  60 Minutes: Death by Doctor (CBS television broadcast Nov. 22, 1998), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4462047n%3fsource=search_video. 
 117. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision-Making, 324 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991); see also Lawrence K. Altman, Doctor Says He Gave Patient Drug 
to Help Her Commit Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at A1 (discussing how Dr. Quill 
“agonized” over the decision to help his patient when she asked him to assist her in ending her 
life). 
 118. Ellen Chesler, Public Triumphs, Private Rights, MS. MAG., Summer 2005, available at 
http://www.msmagazine.com/summer2005/birthcontrol.asp.  Buxton and Griswold were arrested 
for dispensing contraceptives to a married couple and convicted and fined $100 each.  Id.  They 
appealed the conviction.  Their case went to the Supreme Court, which determined that the 
Connecticut law was unconstitutional.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 119. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 120. See Childress, supra note 106, at 64 (“Birth control and abortion have perhaps been the 
subjects of most illegal actions by both professionals and lay people over the last century or so [in 
the area of health care].”). 
 121. JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION 
WAR 10–11 (1998). 
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determination regarding her desire not to have a child.122  Arguably, it was the 
“ideological and humanitarian impulses of [these] physicians pushing them 
into law-breaking.”123  The law’s reaction to this lawbreaking was, for the most 
part, not to prosecute physicians unless the practice came to public attention.124  
Yet, many physicians were uncomfortable with the criminalization of the 
procedure, and physicians as a group became involved in the effort to change 
the law.125 
An additional example where physicians may break the law because they 
believe it is harmful to their patients is when laws and regulations mandate 
aggressive treatment of severely disabled infants with life threatening 
conditions even when the parents have requested termination or withholding of 
such treatment.  These laws include the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Act126 (CAPTA) and its accompanying regulations (also known as the “Baby 
 
 122. See Michael L. Gross, Physician-Assisted Draft Evasion: Civil Disobedience, Medicine, 
and War, 14 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 444, 448 (2005).  Abortions were often 
performed by non-physicians, primarily “midwives and herbalists.”  Jesilow et al., supra note 1, 
at 156. 
 123. Jesilow et al., supra note 1, at 157.  While many physicians had altruistic goals in 
helping women who requested an abortion, it is also true that physicians were behind the early 
efforts to criminalize it, in large part to prevent abortions by competitors, i.e., lay abortionists.  Id. 
at 156. 
 124. See Samuel W. Buell, Note, Criminal Abortion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774, 
1789–90 (1991) (citing J. BATES & E. ZAWADZKI, CRIMINAL ABORTION 35–75 (1964)) (stating 
that there were few abortion convictions because the effort required of law enforcement was not 
justified in light of the ambivalent attitude toward the laws).  The literature indicates that the few 
prosecutions that were performed “targeted notorious or unusually large abortion “rings” or 
“mills”; legitimate doctors were rarely prosecuted.  Id. at 1790; see also Daniel G. Wyllie, 
Comment, Abortion Reform in Michigan—An Analysis of the Proposed Code’s Provisions, 14 
WAYNE L. REV. 1006 (1968). 
 125. Dr. Alan Guttmacher, an outspoken obstetrician for the legalization of abortion, sat in on 
meetings of the American Law Institute (ALI), pushing them to write model legislation that 
would decriminalize abortion.  RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 121, at 11.  Subsequently the AMA 
endorsed the ALI plan (although it only allowed abortion to preserve the life or health of the 
mother or in cases of rape, incest, or severe fetal abnormalities).  Id. 
 126. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116i (2000 & Supp. IV 2007)).  CAPTA provides 
that as a condition of receipt of funds for child abuse prevention and treatment programs, states 
must incorporate within their definition of medical neglect the failure to provide life sustaining 
treatment to severely disabled newborns except in very limited circumstances.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 5106a(b)(2)(B); see 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 app. (2007) (giving “interpretive guidelines” regarding 
allowable exceptions to “medically indicated treatment” of disabled infants).  Failure to 
incorporate the definition means that states are denied federal funds for these programs.  42 
U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B).  Where states have incorporated the federal definition of medical 
neglect into their own definition, physicians could be prosecuted for failure to report the case to 
child protective services, or for manslaughter or criminal negligence for failure to treat when they 
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Doe Rules”), and the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002127 (BAIPA).  
In cases involving treatment of severely disabled newborns, physicians may 
break the rules because (1) they believe it is not in the infant’s best interest to 
continue treatment, but rather that it perpetuates the infant’s suffering, and (2) 
because it deprives the child’s parents of the right to make treatment decisions 
for the child.  While physicians may violate the law by failing to treat these 
infants, this is also an area where law enforcement agents do not seem to 
prosecute physicians.128  Despite such lack of enforcement, there was 
speculation a few years ago that physicians who failed to adequately treat 
newborns might be new targets of prosecutors.  In April 2005, DHHS 
announced it would be investigating all circumstances where an individual or 
entity was reported to be withholding medical care from an infant born alive in 
potential violation of federal statutes (specifically, BAIPA).129  DHHS also 
instructed state child protective service agencies that are responsible for 
implementing regulations to enforce the 1984 Baby Doe Rules and to insist on 
local execution of legal remedies to prevent non-treatment decisions deemed 
impermissible by the Baby Doe Rules.130  Some argued that this directive 
signaled an end to a period of benign regulatory neglect in this area,131 yet 
cases of physicians arrested for violation of these laws have not surfaced. 
In addition to physician-assisted suicide, distribution of contraceptives, 
abortion, treatment of seriously disabled newborns, reporting of child abuse 
 
know that such failure would lead to serious harm or to the death of the child.  See id. 
§ 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii). 
 127. Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (codified 
as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2006)).  BAIPA provides that a viable infant that is born alive must 
be treated as a person under the law.  Id. 
 128. Irene Hurst, Letters to the Editor, First Rule: Choose Your Battles Wisely, 116 
PEDIATRICS 288 (2005) (stating that “no state has prosecuted a single doctor, nurse, medical 
institution, or family under these regulations”). 
 129. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LOG. 
NO. ACYF-CB-PI-05-01, PROGRAM INSTRUCTIONS (2005); see Ceci Connolly, Doctors Are 
Warned on Fetus Care: Guidelines Are Issued on Born-Alive Infants Protection Act, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 23, 2005, at A7. 
 130. See Laura Hermer, The “Born-Alive Infants Protection Act” and Its Potential Impact on 
Medical Care and Practice, HEALTH L. PERSP., Sept. 27, 2006, available at 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2006/(LH)BAIPA.pdf (“Because of the clear 
connection the CAPTA memorandum makes between the failure to provide medical treatment 
and state child abuse and neglect laws, it appears that physicians and hospitals may be subject to a 
criminal charge of abuse and neglect should they withhold medical care from premature and/or 
disabled infants.”). 
 131. See Sadath A. Sayeed, Baby Doe Redux? The Department of Health and Human Services 
and the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002: A Cautionary Note on Normative Neonatal 
Practice, 116 PEDIATRICS e576, e577 (2005) (“[T]he current administration’s resurrection of 
recently quiescent oversight of the treatment of imperiled newborns agitates the legal fault line 
that physicians walk along when caring for these infants.”). 
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and neglect, and dispensing of marijuana, physicians may also exercise “civil 
disobedience” in order to protect patients or to act consistently with their 
ethical norms by performing involuntary euthanasia, terminating treatment 
when they deem it futile, or handing out clean needles to addicts to prevent the 
spread of HIV.  These issues raise profound questions about how the law 
should react to violations of what the violators call “bad law” and how we 
should assess such laws. 
IV.  RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TO PHYSICIANS WHO VIOLATE LAWS 
RELATING TO PATIENT CARE 
The response of law enforcement to physicians who violate the law 
because they claim it harms their patients ranges from seemingly conscious 
disregard for the impact of their actions on patient care and the relevant 
medical evidence, to wise inaction.  In several cases involving patient care, 
prosecutors, arguably, do not appropriately exercise their discretion and target 
physicians who are providing a needed service to a population that finds it 
difficult to obtain care.  This appeared to be the case in the arrest and 
prosecution of Dr. Frank Fisher.132  Fisher, who graduated from Harvard 
Medical School, operated a clinic in northern California where he served a 
large Medi-Cal133 population.134  He had a history of working with indigent 
clients and in underserved communities, including on Native American 
reservations.135  In California, approximately 5%–10% of his 3,000 patients 
“suffered from severe, chronic intractable pain.”136 He was charged with five 
counts of first degree murder stemming from his prescribing of opioids.137  At 
least three of the murder charges appeared entirely bogus.  “For example, one 
of the patients for whom he prescribed opioids died as a passenger in an 
automobile accident.  Another death occurred when a non-patient stole and 
overdosed on medications that Fisher had prescribed to a patient.”138  A third 
patient actually died while Fisher was in jail and she was unable to obtain her 
medications.139  The murder and drug diversion charges against Fisher were all 
subsequently dismissed or dropped, but not until after he served five months in 
 
 132. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 239–42 (discussing Fisher’s arrest, prosecution, and the 
consequent effects on his practice of medicine). 
 133. In California, the Medicaid program is referred to as Medi-Cal.  See Medi-Cal: Provider 
Homepage, http://www.medi-cal.ca.gov/ (last visited May 19, 2009). 
 134. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 239. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 240 (footnote omitted). 
 139. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 240. 
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prison awaiting a preliminary hearing.140  The arrests and prosecutions of other 
pain physicians have also left their patients without adequate pain treatment. 
Once law enforcement agents decide to arrest a physician, their tactics may 
also be unnecessarily dramatic and fear-inducing.  Often physicians are 
arrested in front of their patients.  This has been the case for numerous 
physicians arrested for prescribing opioids to their patients.  In the case of 
Fisher, for example, “over twenty armed law enforcement agents stormed into 
Fisher’s clinic and arrested him.”141  Similarly, “more than a dozen federal 
agents burst into [Dr. Cecil] Knox’s office with guns drawn while he was 
seeing patients and arrested him.  He was taken away in handcuffs and leg 
irons.”142  Federal officials also “marched into Dr. Jeri Hassman’s office while 
she was treating a patient, ‘took off her jewelry, put her in handcuffs and led 
her to jail.’”143 
In the case of physicians prescribing opioids for pain patients, law 
enforcement agents may also pose as patients, attempting to trick the doctor 
into inappropriately prescribing.  Prosecutors have also engaged in 
questionable trial tactics.  During the trial of Dr. William Hurwitz, six past 
presidents of the American Pain Society sent a letter to Hurwitz’s lawyer citing 
“‘misrepresentations’ by one of the Justice Department’s expert witnesses.”144  
In the case of Dr. Robert Weitzel, a physician arrested for murder of four 
severely ill elderly nursing home patients who allegedly died under his care 
because he gave them opioid analgesics to manage their pain and dyspnea, the 
prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence—testimony by a palliative care 
expert that Weitzel did not engage in any criminal wrongdoing.145  The judge 
referred to the prosecution’s behavior as “contraven[ing] manifest 
constitutional, legal, and ethical duties.”146 
Sentencing in these cases can also seem harsh.  In fact, in some cases, the 
judge appears constrained by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and would 
have preferred a more compassionate response.  In the prosecution of Dr. 
Mollie Fry, for authorizing marijuana and growing marijuana for use by her 
patients, herself, and her husband, the judge described the five-year minimum 
sentence as a “‘tragedy’ that should ‘never have happened.’”147  Perhaps 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 239. 
 142. Id. at 242 (footnote omitted). 
 143. Id. at 250 (quoting Marc Kaufman, Worried Pain Doctors Decry Prosecutions, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at A1). 
 144. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 248–49, 248 n.123. 
 145. See Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 235. 
 146. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147. Fry and Shafer Released on Bail Pending Appeal, INDYBAY, Mar. 31, 2007, 
http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2008/03/31/18489777.php (quoting U.S. District Court Judge 
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because of the judge’s sympathy for Fry, he subsequently granted her release 
on bail, stating that Fry (and her husband) had “substantial” grounds for appeal 
that justified their release on bail, including “entrapment, the defendants’ state 
of mind, and the conflict between state and federal laws.”148 
In contrast to these cases, where the law enforcement response seems to 
have ignored claims of patient well-being and been overly harsh, the legal 
system has responded much more discriminately, even compassionately in a 
number of cases where physicians appear to be acting to help their patients.  
This seems to have been the response in the early abortion and contraceptive 
cases, where law enforcement rarely prosecuted physicians or, if they did so, 
only for the most blatant of violations.  Similarly, it seems to characterize the 
system’s current lack of aggressive enforcement of the Baby Doe Rules despite 
the passage of the BAIPA and recent pronouncements of DHHS. 
The latter, more tepid, response may be especially true when the law is in 
flux or when there is considerable societal ambivalence about a law.  This may 
explain the legal system’s response to the cases of Dr. Jack Kevorkian and Dr. 
Timothy Quill.  Kevorkian assisted over 100 individuals end their lives.149  
Between 1990 and 1999 he was arrested and prosecuted numerous times, all 
unsuccessfully, until the case of Thomas Youk in 1999.150  In 1990 and 1992 
Kevorkian was indicted for murder in the death of three individuals; however, 
the cases were dismissed because Michigan had no law against assisting 
suicide and he had “merely” helped the individuals end their own lives with his 
“suicide machine.”151  After these unsuccessful prosecutions, the Michigan 
legislature hurried to pass a fifteen-month ban on assisted suicide.152  
 
Frank Damrell); see also New Book Exposes the First Federal Trial of a Medical Marijuana 
Doctor, supra note 95 (discussing the circumstances leading to Fry’s arrest). 
 148. Fry and Shafer Released on Bail Pending Appeal, supra note 147. 
 149. Monica Davey, Kevorkian Freed After Years in Prison for Aiding Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 2, 2007, at A8. 
 150. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming Kevorkian’s 
conviction for second degree murder and delivery of controlled substances); see Frontline: The 
Kevorkian Verdict: Chronology, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kevorkian/ 
chronology.html (last visited May 20, 2009). 
 151. See People v. Kevorkian, Nos. CR-92-111590-FC, 92-DA-5303-AR, 1992 WL 
12597834 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 21, 1992) (finding that “physician assisted suicide was not a crime 
in Michigan,” thus dismissing the charges of open murder brought against Kevorkian in 1992 for 
assisting in the suicides of Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller); William E. Schmidt, Prosecutors 
Drop Criminal Case Against Doctor Involved in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1990, at 10 
(noting that the Michigan district court dismissed murder charges brought against Kevorkian for 
assisting Jane Adkins commit suicide in 1990 and “[d]eclar[ed] that the debate over euthanasia 
and suicide must be sorted out by the state lawmakers rather than” the courts); see also Frontline: 
The Kevorkian Verdict: Chronology, supra note 150. 
 152. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 752.1021–.1027 (LEXISNEXIS 2001); see also Frontline: 
The Kevorkian Verdict: Chronology, supra note 150 (noting passage of assisted suicide ban). 
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Kevorkian violated the ban several times, but there was some uncertainty about 
the ban’s constitutionality,153 and a jury found him not guilty of violating the 
ban although he admitted to assisting a suicide during the fifteen-month period.  
Subsequently, the state’s court of appeals found the ban unconstitutional for 
“technical” reasons, but shortly thereafter the Michigan Supreme Court 
reversed the court of appeals decision.154  The supreme court also declared that 
a statutory ban was not necessary to prosecute an individual for assisted 
suicide; under the common law, assisted suicide could be prosecuted as a 
felony with a five-year prison term.155  Despite this declaration, Michigan 
juries on three occasions acquitted Kevorkian in subsequent prosecutions for 
assisted suicide.156  During this period, many viewed Kevorkian as a hero, 
helping the cause of physician-assisted dying.157  It was not until 1999 when 
Kevorkian was tried for the first degree murder of Thomas Youk that he was 
found guilty.158  The Youk case, however, was different from the prior cases in 
that Youk, who had Lou Gehrig’s disease, was unable to trigger his own death, 
and Kevorkian directly injected him with a lethal drug.159  The act was also 
televised on 60 Minutes.160  The jury ultimately found Kevorkian guilty of 
 
 153. A judge in Wayne County determined the law to be unconstitutional, but an Oakland 
County prosecutor said the ruling was not binding in his jurisdiction.  Suicide Law Struck Down, 
but Kevorkian Stays Jailed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at A18; see generally Hobbins v. Att’y 
Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing procedural histories of appeals that it 
consolidated from the Wayne and Oakland circuit courts regarding the constitutionality of the 
assisted suicide ban), rev’d People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994). 
 154. Hobbins, 518 N.W.2d at 491 (holding the legislation criminalizing assisted suicide 
constitutionally infirm because it contained “two distinct objects”), rev’d, Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 
714. 
 155. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 739 (“[E]ven absent a statute that specifically proscribes 
assisted suicide, prosecution and punishment for assisting in a suicide would not be precluded.  
Rather, such conduct may be prosecuted as a separate common-law offense . . . .”). 
 156. See Frontline: The Kevorkian Verdict: Chronology, supra note 150 (noting the three 
instances in which Michigan juries acquitted Kevorkian on charges brought against him under the 
state’s assisted suicide ban, including May 2, 1994 for the death of Thomas Hyde; March 8, 1996 
for two separate deaths; and April 1, 1996 for the deaths of Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller); 
Newshour: CBS’ Assisted Suicide Decision (PBS television broadcast Nov. 24, 1998), transcript 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/july-dec98/suicide_11-24.html (referencing 
interview between CBS’s Mike Wallace and Jack Kevorkian); see e.g., David Margolick, Jury 
Acquits Dr. Kevorkian of Illegally Aiding a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at A20 (discussing 
Michigan’s assisted suicide ban in light of Kevorkian’s acquittal of charges brought against him 
for assisting Thomas Hyde commit suicide). 
 157. See Michael Betzold, The Selling of Doctor Death: How Jack Kevorkian Became a 
National Hero, NEW REPUBLIC, May 26, 1997, at 22. 
 158. See People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). 
 159. See id. 
 160. See 60 Minutes: Death by Doctor, supra note 116; see also Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d at 
296 (noting that the videotapes of Kevorkian administering lethal drugs to Youk, which were 
aired on 60 Minutes, were shown to the jury during trial). 
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second degree murder and the judge sentenced him to ten to twenty-five years 
in prison.161  In her sentencing statement, Judge Jessica Cooper was 
undoubtedly influenced by Kevorkian’s blatant disregard for the law stating: 
“[Y]ou had the audacity to go on national television, show the world what you 
did and dare the legal system to stop you.  Well, sir, consider yourself 
stopped.”162 
The response of the criminal justice system to the public disclosure by Dr. 
Timothy Quill that he had assisted one of his patients who suffered from 
leukemia end her life, was clearly one of compassion.163  In an article in the 
New England Journal of Medicine,164 Quill stated that he prescribed the 
patient, a forty-five-year old woman, “with enough barbiturates . . . to commit 
suicide when and if the time came . . . . [He] made sure that she knew how to 
use the barbiturates for sleep, and also that she knew the amount needed to 
commit suicide.”165  The prosecutor brought the case before a grand jury, 
seeking a criminal indictment.  The grand jury, clearly sympathetic to the 
plight of the patient, declined to indict Quill on criminal charges.166 
As demonstrated by these cases and others, there are a number of ways in 
which the criminal justice system may respond to physician lawbreaking when 
society is strongly divided about the correctness of the law.  Prosecutors may 
give low priority to enforcement, or, as in the case of Quill, a grand jury may 
decline to issue an indictment.167  If the case goes to court, juries are often 
sympathetic to physicians when they are performing what is perceived as a 
merciful act.  In many cases, such as those of Kevorkian, where a physician 
has been prosecuted for physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, he or she has 
been acquitted.168  In some cases, this may be a result of jury nullification.  
When a physician is found guilty, judges may have some discretion in how 
they sentence physicians accused of these kinds of crimes and may be more 
 
 161. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d at 296. 
 162. Statement from Judge to Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at A23. 
 163. See supra text accompanying note 117. 
 164. Quill, supra note 117. 
 165. Id. at 693; see also Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He 
Aided in a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at A1 (discussing Quill’s indictment by a grand 
jury for charges brought against him related to his role in his patient’s suicide). 
 166. See Altman, supra note 165. 
 167. See also Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 235–36 (discussing Louisiana v. Pou, in which the 
Louisiana Attorney General was unable to obtain a grand jury indictment against Dr. Anna Pou, 
who allegedly euthanized four patients who could not be evacuated from a health care facility 
after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans). 
 168. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Letting the Public Decide About Assisted Suicide, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 1997, at E4 (describing the acquittal of Dr. Ernesto Pinzon-Reyes on charges of 
“hastening the death of a terminally ill cancer patient”); Ronald J. Hansen, Kevorkian Released 
from Prison After 8 Years, DETROIT NEWS, June 2, 2007, at 1 (noting that Kevorkian had been 
acquitted in several cases of assisted suicide, until he represented himself in court). 
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lenient when societal views about the issue are strongly divided.  The various 
points in the process offer a set of safety valves to put the brakes on a system 
that might otherwise be too quick to lump all accused in the same category. 
Prosecutor reluctance to enforce or charge and jury reluctance to convict 
may stem from two problems with the relevant laws: the lack of a consensus as 
to their moral validity and to their medical justification.  Often, these laws have 
a moral basis and there is not agreement among the profession or across 
society as to whether the prohibited actions are wrong as a normative matter.  
While some legal enforcement of morality may be uncontroversial—when the 
law requires some to refrain from acts that “others” think are immoral, but the 
target of the law does not—compliance may be limited.169  This may be 
especially true when the moral judgments are religiously based.170 
Additionally, these laws are medically questionable.  There is often 
disagreement within the profession as to what is medically appropriate in some 
of these cases, e.g., physicians may not agree on what is the appropriate dosage 
of opioids to prescribe to a chronic pain patient; what treatment is in the best 
interest of a severely impaired and premature newborn; when medical care is 
truly futile; or whether physician-assisted suicide is justified.  Different views 
within the profession prevent establishment of a unified standard of care and 
make arguments to harshly treat these physicians more difficult.171 
V.  OBSERVATIONS, SUGGESTIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
The ways in which physicians respond to the law affirm David Mechanic’s 
observation that medicine has its share of angels and scoundrels; yet it is not 
always clear in which group they belong.  For those physicians who break the 
law, the reasons for their actions will no doubt affect our assessment.  When 
greed is the motivation, we want to condemn physicians for their actions and 
punish them harshly.  In the case of violation of the fraud laws, these doctors 
appear to view themselves as “above the law” and, as Professor Johnson 
suggests, to push the boundaries of safe harbors.172  These physicians may also 
lack the sensitivity to either the legal or extra-legal sanctions that accompany 
lawbreaking and do not see breaking these laws as being in conflict with their 
professional identity.  They often view the laws as unfair and feel their actions 
are justified in order to receive “appropriate” compensation for their work.  
 
 169. See Greenawalt, supra note 102, at 710 (“[M]uch legal enforcement of morality is 
uncontroversial and rarely discussed.”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 233 (finding that “divergent views of the standard of 
care” were a feature of the five cases they reviewed in which physicians were criminally 
prosecuted in conjunction with palliative or end of life care). 
 172. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1019 (“There is some sense that doctors are willing to push the 
envelope on the financial side . . . and are less willing to do that . . . in their clinical decisions.”). 
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Yet, there are other physicians for whom greed is not the basis of their 
violation of the fraud laws.  In some cases, they believe the insurance rules are 
harmful to their patients, in others, their violation of the law is not intentional; 
it is due to negligence and ignorance of the law.  Similarly, when physicians 
violate the CSA because they are prescribing opioids for chronic pain patients, 
in some cases the motivation may be greed, but often it is because they are 
trying to treat their patients’ pain.  In the latter case, they may not know they 
are breaking the law or they may disagree with the law, believing that their 
prescribing is appropriate.  In many of these cases, as well as some fraud cases, 
the government response appears overly zealous and lacks judicious discretion.  
However, in cases where the motivation for the physician’s action is clearly 
not greed but is patient care, the legal response varies from wise inaction to 
disregard of relevant medical evidence. 
In this section, based on the reasons that physicians appear to violate both 
the fraud laws and laws regarding patient care, as well as observations about 
how our law enforcement system reacts to this physician behavior, I make a 
series of suggestions.  These suggestions are geared toward improving 
physician compliance with the law and improving the quality of patient care. 
A. Need for Law Enforcement to Consider Impact on Patients 
In exercising its discretion to pursue physicians for alleged wrongdoing, 
law enforcement appears to ignore the impact of its actions on patient care.  
Failure to take this factor into account is misguided.  The impact assessment 
should begin with some consideration of the trauma caused to patients by law 
enforcement personnel who barge into physicians’ offices to arrest them while 
they are seeing patients, with guns drawn, and in SWAT team attire.173  Such 
dramatic and strong-arm tactics seem wholly unnecessary and are likely 
harmful to the innocent patients who are forced to witness them. 
Moreover, law enforcement should consider how arrest and prosecution of 
physicians may affect patient access to health care.  Doctors who are arrested 
and prosecuted for fraud or inappropriate prescribing not only face possible jail 
time and fines but are also likely to lose their licenses, staff privileges, or both.  
Effectively, they are lost from the numbers of physicians available to treat 
patients.  The little data that is available seems to indicate that often the 
physicians who are targeted for arrest by prosecutors for fraud are working in 
 
 173. See, e.g., Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 242 (discussing the arrest of Dr. Cecil Knox based 
on various charges related to his prescribing of narcotics) (citing Maia Szalavitz, Dr. Feelscared: 
Drug Warriors Put the Fear of Prosecution in Physicians Who Dare to Treat Pain, REASON, 
Aug. 2004, at 32); see also supra text accompanying notes 142–43. 
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underserved areas or with underserved populations.174  Taking these physicians 
out of circulation may mean that their patients lack access to a licensed 
physician, except in a medical emergency. 
These arrests and prosecutions may also have a chilling effect on the 
behavior of other physicians.175  A national survey of 331 doctors conducted 
by the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons (AAPS) in July 
1999, regarding the impact of Medicare regulations and the increased 
government crackdown on fraudulent billing, revealed that “[i]ncreased fear of 
prosecution or government retaliation has had a negative impact on patients’ 
access to doctors and their ability to receive certain services such as 
surgery.”176  Over 80% reported “increased fear of prosecution or investigation 
in the prior three years”; 71% “reported making changes in their practice to 
avoid the threat of prosecution, including greatly restricting services.”177  More 
than one-third (34%) of all physician respondents had restricted services, such 
as surgery, to Medicare patients.178  Almost one-fourth (23%) said they were 
not accepting new Medicare patients, and reported that the desire to avoid 
unpleasant or even threatening encounters with Medicare was a reason for this 
change in practice pattern.179  Respondents also complained that compliance 
with Medicare regulations took a significant amount of their time away from 
patient care.180 
In addition, the arrest and prosecution of physicians for prescribing opioids 
has had far-reaching impacts on the treatment of chronic pain patients.  Due to 
the limited number of physicians willing to treat this patient population, these 
prosecutions have made it more difficult, in some cases impossible, for chronic 
pain patients to find physicians who will treat them.181 
B. Complexity/Legitimacy of Laws 
The fact that such a large number of physicians are being arrested and 
prosecuted for fraud and prescription drug violations raises the possibility of 
 
 174. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, An Economic Model to Analyze the Impact of False Claims 
Act Cases on Access to Healthcare for the Elderly, Disabled, Rural and Inner-City Poor, 27 AM. 
J.L. &. MED. 439, 462–66 (2001). 
 175. See generally id. (discussing the “chilling effect” in terms of physician behavior that 
results from the uncertainty or inability to predict which behavior will lead to false certification 
prosecutions). 
 176. See Press Release, Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Doctors’ Study: Medicare 
“Fraud” Crackdown Hurts Patients (Feb. 4, 2000), available at http://aapsonline.org/press/ 
medspr.htm. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 235. 
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overreaching on the part of prosecutors, and should raise red-flags for those of 
us concerned about the legitimacy of the rules and their enforcement, as well 
as their impact on patient care and the health care system. 
Physicians who violate the fraud laws, in some cases, may have been 
motivated by their moral evaluation of the act, i.e., they may not have viewed 
their behavior as wrong or they may have viewed the law as unfair.  The 
literature lends support to this interpretation of the behavior of physicians who 
intentionally break the fraud laws.182  Both physicians and medical students 
were more likely to blame the Medicare and Medicaid billing rules for 
physician arrests and prosecutions than the actions of the physicians.183 
The literature on white-collar crime acknowledges that one’s moral beliefs, 
independent of considerations of costs and benefits, can constrain illegal 
behavior.184  But, perhaps equally likely, moral beliefs may lead to illegal 
behavior if the law is deemed to be unfair or unjust.  In those circumstances, 
the response of the criminal justice system is typically to increase sanctions in 
order to ensure compliance.  Over the last decade in fact, the sanctions for 
violation of the fraud laws have been significantly increased.185  Another route, 
however, could be to either persuade physicians that the Medicare and 
Medicaid billing procedures are fair or to change them so that they are fairer. 
Physician reaction to the fraud laws stems largely from the complexity of 
the billing rules for Medicare and Medicaid.  Thus, this may be a starting point 
for reform.  In Japan, the perceived unfairness of the medical insurance 
reimbursement system led to widespread fraud but the government, 
understanding the flaws of the system, elected not to aggressively prosecute 
physicians who violated the rules.186  In the United States, we have a 
reimbursement system that is perceived as unfair yet it is aggressively 
enforced.  The two in combination seem especially misguided and suggest the 
need to simplify or rework the Medicare and Medicaid rules for billing and 
fraud control and, or at least until that occurs, adopt a less aggressive 
enforcement policy. 
Physician complaints about laws stem from concerns not only about the 
fairness of the laws but also about the fairness of their enforcement.  In the 
 
 182. See Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: 
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 579 (1996) 
(finding that white-collar criminals use a utilitarian calculation when deciding to break the law 
but include in that calculation their moral assessment of the law). 
 183. See Keenan et al., supra note 37, at 170–71. 
 184. Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 182, at 554. 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 50–56. 
 186. See Ames Gross & Gayatri B. Koolwal, Patient Disclosure Rights in Japan’s Healthcare 
System, PAC. BRIDGE MED., Mar. 1998, http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications/ 
japan/1998_patient_disclosure_rights_in_japans.htm (noting that the “Japanese are loathe to use 
[legal] means” to improve the quality of patient care). 
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fraud area, there are numerous anecdotes about physicians who have been 
criminally prosecuted for relatively minor infractions, i.e., less than a few 
hundred dollars of overbilling.187  In some cases, the sanctions also seem 
largely incommensurate with the violation.  Moreover, at least early in the 
program’s history, numerous financial incentives existed for law enforcement 
agents to arrest and prosecute physicians for fraud violations.188  These 
allegations and facts contribute to a perception that the entire fraud 
enforcement system is unfair and threatens the overall legitimacy of the fraud 
control effort.  Professor William Sage has observed that the focus of the fraud 
laws on protecting the financial integrity of the Medicare and Medicaid 
systems rather than patient welfare “tends to breed cynicism among physicians 
and brings fraud enforcement into conflict with sound health policy.”189  
Others have warned that more aggressive law enforcement initiatives “could 
threaten the long-term political support that is essential to sustaining [fraud 
control] efforts and might upset the balance between effective fraud control 
and the burden of compliance.”190 
C. Turning Negligence into Crime 
An additional observation that surfaces after reviewing the cases in which 
physicians “break the law” is the broad reach of the law to include 
unintentional violations.  There is general agreement that someone who 
intentionally or knowingly breaks a good law should be prosecuted and 
punished.  However, when the violation of the law is unknowing or 
unintentional,191 criminal sanctions may not be appropriate as applied to 
 
 187. See LIBBY, supra note 53, at 32.  For example, Libby notes that “[d]uring Richard 
Kusserow’s tenure as [Inspector General of DHHS] from 1981 to 1992, he inaugurated a veritable 
reign of terror against physicians and other providers.  [He] encouraged trivial and malicious 
prosecutions of doctors for alleged fraud of less than a hundred dollars.”  Id.  Libby also provides 
examples of similarly aggressive prosecutions by state Medicaid Fraud Control Units (FCU).  He 
cites the Hawaii FCU, under the direction of George Yamamoto, which “prosecuted an optician 
who was convicted of a criminal felony for overbilling Medicaid by $7.75.”  Id. at 34. 
 188. Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 246 (2004) (describing funding and incentives in fraud control). 
 189. William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse Law, 282 JAMA 1179, 1180 (1999).  Sage refers to 
“burdensome coding requirements for evaluation and management [that] continue the unfortunate 
transformation of the medical record from a clinical management tool into a defensive 
document.”  Id. 
 190. ROBERT BERENSON ET AL., AARP PUB. POLICY INST., COST CONTAINMENT IN 
MEDICARE: A REVIEW OF WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T 61 (2008), available at 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/2008_18_medicare.pdf. 
 191. The Model Penal Code includes intentional, knowing, reckless, and negligent as mental 
states that may be sufficient to establish criminal intent.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(d) 
(1962). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1080 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1049 
physicians, despite the fact that the law may allow for it.  In these cases, the 
law may be overly broad, permitting criminal prosecution for negligence. 
As regards the fraud laws, it is difficult to know whether physicians 
intentionally or knowingly violate the law, but it appears that in some cases 
physicians are being arrested, prosecuted, and threatened with criminal 
sanctions for technical, or regulatory, violations.  Given the multitude and 
complexity of rules governing Medicare and Medicaid billing, it is possible 
that in some cases physicians are not intentionally violating the law but are 
making mistakes in their billing practices.  Again, prosecutions for such 
actions raise concerns about fairness and legitimacy.  Rosenzweig argues that 
as we expand what constitutes criminal wrongs “to include trivial matters more 
suitably treated as civil wrongs, those who act in good faith yet get caught by 
the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority perceive themselves as victims 
of an over-zealous regulatory state that trivializes crime . . . and erodes its 
moral footing.”192  Certainly, an argument can be made that such violations 
should not be subject to criminal prosecution at all, but if they are, sanctions 
for those who unintentionally commit these technical violations should be less 
severe than for those where intentionality is clear.193 
In addition to the arrests and prosecutions of physicians for fraud, scores of 
physicians are being arrested and prosecuted for drug abuse and diversion 
based on a standard that is “uncomfortably close” to a civil malpractice 
standard.194  The standard has led to the conviction of numerous physicians 
who were prescribing large volumes of scheduled drugs, e.g., opioids, and 
treating a large number of chronic pain patients.  In many of these cases, there 
was no evidence that the physicians benefited financially from their 
prescribing (other than for the office visit).  Moreover, “experts disputed the 
‘reasonableness’ of the physician’s prescribing practices; and . . . the 
physician’s patients often included drug addicts who lied to the physician to 
obtain their drugs.”195 
In addition, under the CSA, while the statutory language for criminal 
liability requires that a physician knowingly violate the law,196 the courts have 
eroded that requirement in a way that is arguably harmful to patients.  As in the 
cases of fraud, “[b]ecause determining what the physician actually knew or 
intended is difficult, ‘courts have held that a deliberate course of conduct 
whereby the defendant avoids the requisite guilty knowledge may be held 
 
 192. Rosenzweig Testimony, supra note 62, at 145. 
 193. See id. at 152–53. 
 194. Under the CSA, a physician is guilty of criminal conduct if he or she prescribes without 
a “legitimate medical purpose” and outside “the usual course of his professional practice.”  21 
C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2008); see supra text accompanying notes 76–82. 
 195. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 239. 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 76–82. 
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tantamount to guilty knowledge per se.’”197  In these cases, the trial court often 
issues to the jury a “‘conscious avoidance’ charge, also known as a ‘willful 
blindness’ instruction”198 or an “ostrich instruction, because the defendant is 
considered by the court to have, figuratively, stuck his head in the sand to 
avoid learning truths that would otherwise have been patently obvious to the 
average reasonable person.”199 
For the more common cases of illegal drug distribution, the instructions 
have been used where the defendant is accused of transporting drugs in a 
suitcase or handbag and claims not to have been aware that the bag contained 
the drugs.  The instructions, however, have been borrowed from that setting 
and applied in cases against physicians who prescribed drugs to patients who 
subsequently diverted them.  In these cases, the prosecution argues that the 
physician “deliberately ignored facts that would have led [a reasonable 
physician] to believe the patient was diverting the drugs.”200 
A willful blindness instruction is inappropriate in this context as it 
undermines the doctor-patient relationship.  I have argued elsewhere that: 
[d]octors . . . must develop a trusting relationship with their patients, which 
requires them to listen to their patients and believe their accounts of their 
symptoms . . . . [T]his is especially true in the field of pain management where 
there is no objective test for pain.  Neither is there a wholly accurate test to 
determine whether the patient is telling the truth or fabricating his symptoms.  
Physicians who ignore their patient’s pain accounts would be arguably 
negligent.  Prosecutors and the DEA argue that “doctors violate the law when 
they prescribe pain pills to patients who they know—or reasonably should 
know—are selling or abusing the drugs.”  But, this puts physicians in the 
position of being watch dogs for law enforcement or, at least, suspicious of 
their patients’ claims of pain.201 
Deborah Hellman, in an article that focuses on the use of the willful 
blindness instruction in these cases and whether the physician’s professional 
 
 197. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 276 (quoting Deborah Sprenger, Annotation, Propriety of 
Instruction of Jury on “Conscious Avoidance” of Knowledge of Nature of Substance or 
Transaction in Prosecution for Possession or Distribution of Drugs, 109 A.L.R. FED. 710, 713, § 
2[a] (1992)). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 276 n.340 (quoting Sprenger, supra note 197, at 710, 713, § 2[a]) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 200. Id. at 276–77. 
 201. Id. at 303 (footnotes omitted).  Dr. William Hurwitz, a pain doctor who was criminally 
prosecuted under this standard, has written that the standard “forces doctors who try to treat pain 
to act like police, reinforcing a perverse medical paternalism that subverts the ethical imperatives 
designed to protect patient autonomy and dignity.  This distortion of the patient-physician 
relationship stigmatizes patients and erodes their trust.”  Id. at 304 (quoting William E. Hurwitz, 
Pain Control in the Police State of Medicine (Part II), 8 J. AM. PHYS. & SURGEONS 13, 14 
(2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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obligations should provide a defense to the charges at issue, argues both that 
“[p]rosecuting doctors for being willfully blind to a patient’s wrongful 
reselling of drugs criminalizes physicians’ trust in their patients” and that 
“doctors treating patients in pain act rightly in trusting their patients, and thus 
the law erroneously imposes criminal sanctions on actions that are morally 
justified.”202 
The expansion of the white-collar criminal law and drug control laws to 
include unintentional violations may also have led to recent criminal 
prosecutions of physicians for medical negligence.  There are no 
comprehensive data on the number of cases in which physicians have been 
prosecuted for criminal negligence, but, while the numbers are quite small,203 
they appear to be growing. 
In 1990, the AMA commented that the “prosecution of physicians for 
clinical mistakes was ‘almost unknown.’”204  However, a series of criminal 
prosecutions of physicians in the late 1980s and early 1990s prompted the 
AMA to adopt a resolution “to insure that medical decision-making exercised 
in good faith, does not become a violation of criminal law.”205  In 1995, the 
AMA adopted a more formal statement on the subject condemning the “current 
trend” of the criminalization of medical malpractice.206  At the time of that 
statement, “the AMA estimated [that] only about [ten] physicians nationwide 
had been prosecuted for medical negligence” but feared increased prosecutions 
in this area.207  Two articles published in 2001 and one article published in 
2007 describe cases where physicians were prosecuted for medical negligence 
in the recent past.  Filkins identified nine cases between 1981 and 1995;208  
Liederbach et al. identified fifteen cases between 1986 and 1999,209 and Kollas 
et al. reviewed five criminal prosecutions against physicians occurring between 
1992 and 2005 involving palliative or end of life care.210 
 
 202. Deborah Hellman, Prosecuting Doctors for Trusting Patients, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
701, 702 (2009). 
 203. See James A. Filkins, “With No Evil Intent”: The Criminal Prosecution of Physicians for 
Medical Negligence, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 467, 471–72 (2001) (noting that there are only fifteen 
reported appellate decisions of such prosecutions between 1809 and 1981). 
 204. Id. at 469–70 (quoting Pennsylvania Prosecutor Finds No Grounds for Charges Against 
Surgeon, AM. MED. NEWS, June 1, 1990, at 5). 
 205. Id. at 470 (quoting Morton M. Kurtz, Criminalization of Medical Judgment, Resolution 
223, PROC. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERIM MEETING (1993)). 
 206. Id. (quoting Criminalization of Health Care Decision-Making, Resolution 202, PROC. 
AM. MED. ASS’N, INTERIM MEETING (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Liederbach et al., supra note 3, at 164 (citing AMA Policy H-160.946). 
 207. Filkins, supra note 203, at 470. 
 208. Id. at 471–90.  The cases actually include prosecutions of eight physicians and one 
corporation for medical negligence.  Id. at 471. 
 209. Liederbach et al., supra note 3, at 150–56. 
 210. Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 234–36. 
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Research on these cases indicates that a common element is disagreement 
about the relevant standard of care.  Filkins observed that these cases are often 
inappropriately addressed in the criminal justice system as prosecutors fail to 
establish that the physician breached a standard of care or that the physician’s 
actions caused the patient’s harm.211  Rather, the physician’s state of mind acts 
as a substitute for careful scrutiny of the physician’s actions and their impact 
on the patient’s injury.212  He argues that “[a] defendant physician’s state of 
mind should be weighed only after the issues of causation and standard of care 
have been resolved and all the facts considered.  To do otherwise exposes 
physicians ‘to potential criminal liability for their actions related purely to their 
exercise of professional clinical judgment.’”213  Kollas et al. similarly 
concluded that establishing a violation of the standard of care was a weak link 
in the prosecution of a number of physicians who were charged with homicide 
for the death of patients who were terminally ill.214 
The justification for use of the criminal laws has traditionally included 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  When physicians are prosecuted for 
negligent acts, it is unlikely that such actions will have a deterrent effect.  
Deterrence is grounded in rational choice theory, which assumes actors weigh 
the costs and benefits of their acts.  When their acts are not intentional, such a 
model has less explanatory value.215  Alternatively, efforts to prosecute 
physicians for negligent acts may have an “anti-deterrent” effect.  Liederbach 
et al. speculate that “when prosecutions occur, they will trigger an 
‘oppositional culture’ among doctors, in which physicians band together to 
define such intervention as illegitimate and characterize the doctors to which 
they are applied as scapegoats of politically ambitious prosecutors.”216  If this 
is so, they conclude that “such resistance to control might create ‘defiance’ and 
produce effects that undermine deterrence.”217 
The goal of rehabilitation is also unlikely to be met through criminal 
sanctions for negligent behavior.  Arguably, these physicians could benefit 
from mentoring or retraining, but they will not be subject to these forms of 
 
 211. Filkins, supra note 203, at 498. 
 212. Id. at 498. 
 213. Id. at 498–99 (quoting State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 224 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) 
(Brazil, C.J., dissenting)). 
 214. Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 237–38. 
 215. See Liederbach, supra note 3, at 166 (“[T]he extent to which white-collar offenders are 
deterrable by legal sanctions remains uncertain.  This issue is likely to be complicated still further 
in the case of doctors, where the behavior targeted for deterrence is perhaps not intended nor due 
to rational calculation . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id.  But Liederbach et al. also hypothesize that such prosecutions could have a deterrent 
effect by creating stronger incentives for doctors to police their peers and adopt practices that 
reduce medical errors and improve patient safety.  Id. at 167. 
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rehabilitation through the criminal justice system.218  These educational 
approaches, however, could be imposed by state medical boards, if they were 
to become more active in disciplining these types of cases. 
This leaves retribution as the primary objective for prosecution of 
physicians for gross medical malpractice.  This justification for criminalization 
is least applicable when intent is absent. 
D. Need for Law Enforcement Self-Assessment Regarding Impact 
It also becomes clear, from reviewing physician lawbreaking and the law 
enforcement response, that there is a failure on the part of law enforcement to 
adequately evaluate its own effectiveness.  For example, regarding the fraud 
laws and their enforcement, while there appear to be some indications that the 
increased expenditure on fraud control has had a deterrent effect, the impact of 
that effect is unknown.219  Moreover, there appear to be few efforts to 
determine whether the costs associated with the system are commensurate with 
the benefit.  Efforts to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the laws and their 
enforcement seem to focus most often on return on investment, i.e., the number 
of government dollars spent on enforcement and the dollars recovered from 
fines and sanctions, rather than an effort to look at the full costs and benefits of 
the program to society.220  The latter, for example, would include the cost to 
physicians of compliance with the complex billing rules,221 the costs of false 
positives (i.e., those physicians who are inappropriately captured, prosecuted, 
and sanctioned), the costs to patients who are unable to find a physician to treat 
them or who are denied care, as well as any benefits that may result from 
reductions in unnecessary treatment.222  In addition, there does not appear to be 
 
 218. See generally Russell E. Farbiarz, Victim-Offender Mediation: A New Way of 
Disciplining America’s Doctors, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 359, 362 (2008) (noting that 
rehabilitation was “abandoned as the primary goal [of the criminal justice system] in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s” but that it could be reintroduced to physicians through victim-offender mediation). 
 219. See BERENSON ET AL., supra note 190, at 60. 
 220. See, e.g., id. at 61. 
 221. Sage has observed that “fraud compliance has become a full-time job for providers as 
well as enforcers, raising the risk of symbiotic bureaucracies that waste rather than preserve 
resources.”  Sage, supra note 189, at 1180. 
 222. An academic study by Becker et al., for example, 
analyzed the impact of increased support for fraud enforcement activities on the costs and 
quality of care provided to Medicare patients . . . . The authors concluded that increased 
fraud enforcement resources result in greater declines in expenditures . . . without 
evidence of an increase in adverse health outcomes.  There were, however, significant 
differences in the effects of increased enforcement across different types of patients (e.g., 
age, gender, and race) and hospitals (e.g., ownership type, size, and location). 
BERENSON ET AL., supra note 190, at 60 (citing David Becker et al., Detecting Medicare Abuse, 
24 J. HEALTH ECON. 189, 189–210 (2005)). 
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consideration of the potential benefit of alternatives to aggressive enforcement 
of the fraud laws. 
There is some acknowledgement in the literature that the fraud laws were 
initially quite effective at reducing large scale fraud and blatant violations of 
the law such as “Medicaid mills” where physicians billed for services not 
rendered.223  Today, the law enforcement efforts related to these laws seem 
more targeted at uncovering fraud in mainstream medical practice where the 
wrongdoing is often based on technical violations of the law and is very costly 
to discover and prosecute.224  While enforcement efforts are assisted by 
whistleblowers, they still require painstaking record review and attention to 
minute billing details.225  These more recent efforts may have diminishing 
returns, especially when the violations are associated with technical oversights.  
Moreover, a recent report by AARP, based on interviews with several former 
government officials, found that “efforts to enlist beneficiaries[] [as 
whistleblowers to] help in identifying fraud have not been successful” due to 
the complexity of the Medicare billing rules and the “difficulty of 
distinguishing innocent billing errors from intentional fraud.”226 
Finally, policy makers should consider the effectiveness of the fraud 
control laws and their enforcement in comparison to alternative approaches to 
combating fraud.  Hyman argues, for example, “that Medicare has 
underinvested in prepayment claims review and has compensated for this by 
imposing very severe sanctions on fraudulent claims through the [False Claims 
Act] and other legal tools.”227  Similarly, in the area of prosecution of 
physicians for prescribing of opioids, the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) does not appear to have evaluated whether its efforts 
have reduced drug diversion and abuse and/or how those efforts have affected 
patient access to care. 
Failure to assess their practices appears to be quite common among law 
enforcement entities.  In his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Crime and Drugs in 2002, Rosenzweig pointed out that 
there is virtually no data on whether or not criminal enforcement programs 
actually have a deterrent effect, much less assessments of the quantum of that 
effect.  Instead, agencies prosecuting white-collar crime routinely report only 
 
 223. See Paul E. Kalb, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 282 JAMA 1163, 1163 (1999). 
 224. See id. 
 225. See LIBBY, supra note 53, at 24 (“The government has broadened its definition of health 
fraud at a time that most ‘big time’ fraud in health care has been eliminated.  Prosecutors are now 
increasingly forced to concentrate upon nit-picking technical interpretations of regulations to 
convict solo practitioners.”). 
 226. BERENSON ET AL., supra note 190, at 60. 
 227. Id. at 60–61 (citing David A. Hyman, HIPAA and Health Care Fraud: An Empirical 
Perspective, 22 CATO J. 151 (2002)). 
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the number of cases they have brought, without any attempt to determine the 
effectiveness of their activity.228 
Nor do they appear to assess the costs of their activities beyond government 
expenditures. 
These comments highlight a major difference between medical practice 
and law enforcement practice.  While quality improvement has become an 
integral part of health care systems, the concept seems to be foreign to law 
enforcement.  Law enforcement agencies do not appear to make efforts to 
assess the impact of their practices or whether they are achieving their ultimate 
goals and at what cost. 
E. Need for System of Expert Advice to Law Enforcement 
Many of the cases where law enforcement has “overreached” might have 
been avoided by prosecutors and law enforcement agents if they had consulted 
or collaborated with medical experts to determine whether the physician who 
was the target of their investigation was a threat to the public by virtue of their 
medical practice.  This is especially true in the context of physicians arrested 
for the prescribing of opioids or for gross negligence.  Such medical expertise 
could come from state medical boards.  Arguably, there needs to be better 
collaboration between state medical boards and prosecutors.  In a study of 
cases where physicians were prosecuted for drug diversion, Reidenberg and 
Willis found that in the large majority, state medical boards had not been 
consulted at all prior to the physician’s criminal indictment.229 
In a number of other countries, e.g., Japan, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, 
and India, physicians are prosecuted for medical acts largely because of the 
“lack of alternative forms of redress,” such as disciplinary actions by medical 
boards.230  Given the existence of these entities in the United States, however, 
it seems inappropriate to jump to the criminal justice system to address cases 
related to standards of patient care.  State medical boards are certainly better 
equipped to evaluate acceptable medical practice and the threat of a 
physician’s practices to public welfare than are federal and state prosecutors.231  
Admittedly, state medical boards are often underfunded and understaffed and 
 
 228. Rosenzweig Testimony, supra note 62, at 155. 
 229. M.M. Reidenberg & O. Willis, Prosecution of Physicians for Prescribing Opioids to 
Patients, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 903, 905 (2007). 
 230. Edward Monico et al., The Criminal Prosecution of Medical Negligence, 5 INTERNET 
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 231. See Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 307 (arguing in the context of prosecution for drug 
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of opioids prescribed for a patient are consistent with acceptable medical practice than are federal 
and state prosecutors”). 
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cannot devote the resources necessary to adequately police all cases of 
physician wrongdoing.  But, there is no reason why federal law enforcement 
agents should not consult with state medical boards regarding the need for 
disciplinary action in a given case, especially before criminal prosecution.  In 
addition, greater resources could be devoted to state medical boards, perhaps 
by reallocating resources currently being devoted to federal and state criminal 
enforcement of medical wrongdoing.  Such a shift may both reduce the need 
for criminal action and improve the quality of medical care. 
F. Physician Disobedience as Call for Further Scrutiny and Possible Legal 
Change 
A final observation when looking across the ways in which law 
enforcement responds to physician violation of the law, is that when physicians 
intentionally violate the law to care for patients or engage in actions that might 
be categorized as civil disobedience, more often than not, they appear to be 
dealt with fairly by the individualized safety valves incorporated in the 
criminal justice system.  Perhaps, as a result, initiatives to change these laws 
are often ineffective.  Failure on the part of legislators to respond to bad law 
claims where physicians are being criminally prosecuted, however, may be 
based on an effort to signal moral wrongdoing rather than on evidence that the 
laws are providing greater benefit than harm.  In many of these cases, 
legislators considered the potential negative patient impact of the laws and 
struck a balance between the competing policy and moral arguments that shape 
where the line is drawn between legal and illegal activity.  While in some 
cases, the policy arguments might weigh in favor of repealing the law, 
legislators have decided that there are important values or moral reasons to 
keep the law in effect. 
In many cases, however, the moral values that have tipped the balance in 
the legislative equation are not uniformly shared by society.  Oftentimes these 
moral values may blind legislators to new policy arguments or empirical 
evidence.  But, legislators should be open to new information and data about 
the impact and effectiveness of the laws that they passed, willing to consider a 
recalibration of the balance. 
When physician lawbreaking in the patient’s interest is fairly isolated, the 
criminal justice system may respond appropriately and compassionately.  But 
when physician lawbreaking based on asserted fiduciary duties to patients 
becomes more widespread, policy makers should seek to collect and compile 
data on the impact of the law on patients.  Initial assumptions underlying the 
passage of the law may have been misguided or not empirically supported.  For 
example, discussions regarding the criminalization of physician-assisted dying 
came to the fore during the time that Dr. Jack Kevorkian was assisting 
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individuals end their lives.232  The policy arguments put forth by those who 
opposed the legalization of physician-assisted suicide included concerns that 
vulnerable individuals, including the elderly, women, the uninsured, the poor, 
and people with limited education, would be overrepresented in the group of 
individuals who would take advantage of the service, as they would be 
“considered marginal and expendable and come under pressure to end their 
lives prematurely.”233  Ten years of experience and empirical data from 
Oregon, where physician-assisted suicide is legal, have shown that these 
concerns have not been borne out.234  Instead, the results indicate an 
improvement of end of life care in Oregon and, in particular, knowledge of 
palliative care and use of hospice.235 
Initiatives based on empirical data of the impact of various laws on patient 
care may help to persuade policy makers of the need to change existing laws.  
On the other hand, policy arguments cannot necessarily counter moral 
concerns.  Yet, by providing better data to inform policy arguments and 
challenge unfounded views, the debate can be narrowed down to the core 
issues at stake, whether they are morally, policy, or politically driven. 
In conclusion, I agree with Professor Johnson that when we encounter a 
situation where physicians complain about bad law because it prevents them 
from appropriately treating patients, we should take such claims seriously and 
legislators should treat them as sentinel events.  This is especially true when 
physicians break the law, not out of some selfish motive, but in order to 
provide better care to their patients.  And, even when doctors who break the 
law have motives that are difficult to disentangle but may include dual 
motivations, i.e., patient care and economic gain, we should not ignore them 
but rather urge greater efforts at evaluating the impact of these laws on patient 
care. 
 
 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 149–62. 
 233. KATHRYN L. TUCKER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, CHOICE AT THE 
END OF LIFE: LESSONS FROM OREGON 8 (June 2008), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kathryn%20 
L.%20Tucker%20Issue%20Brief.pdf (citing Brief for Not Dead Yet et al., as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Defendants-Appellants, Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). 
 234. See Margaret P. Battin et al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the 
Netherlands: Evidence Concerning the Impact on Patients in “Vulnerable” Groups, 33 J. MED. 
ETHICS 591, 597 (2007) (“[W]e found no evidence to justify the grave and important concern 
often expressed about the potential for abuse—namely, the fear that legalised physician-assisted 
dying will target the vulnerable or pose the greatest risk to people in vulnerable groups.”). 
 235. See TUCKER, supra note 233, at 9.  Based on this data, recently the American Public 
Health Association and the American College of Legal Medicine joined the American Medical 
Women’s Association and the American Medical Students’ Association in adopting policies 
supporting the practice of aid in dying.  Id. at 12. 
